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The Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
and the Chief of the Seekriegsleitung.

Report by the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Führer at Headquarters "Wolfsschanze" the evening of 12 March 1942.

1. Submarine Warfare. We must carry on submarine warfare to the utmost, in order to take advantage of the unpreparedness of the United States, for we can most effectively fight England by reducing available cargo space. Losses of submarines, 2.4 per month.

2. The War in the North.

A. The TIRPITZ made a sortie into the Arctic Ocean when planes reported a fifteen ship enemy convoy near Jan Mayen, headed for Russia. The Naval Staff is of the opinion that in such cases all forces available must be used unconditionally for the important task of disrupting the shipment of supplies to Russia or preventing enemy landings. The TIRPITZ was unable to intercept the convoy. The latter evidently changed its course when the enemy realized that they had been sighted by German planes. A strong enemy task force including an aircraft carrier was sent out in pursuit of the TIRPITZ. In spite of daring attacks by torpedo planes, the enemy was unsuccessful. Skillful defense maneuvers, coupled with good luck, were responsible for the TIRPITZ' escape.

Conclusions drawn from this operation: This operation reveals the weakness of our own naval forces in the northern area. The enemy responds to every German sortie by sending out strong task forces, particularly aircraft carriers, which are the greatest menace to our heavy ships. The extreme weakness of our defenses is evidenced by the fact that the enemy dares to advance into the coastal waters of the northern area without being smashed by the German Air Force. Our own defensive forces (destroyers and torpedo boats) are so few in number that our ships are always extremely hard pressed whenever they come in contact with the enemy.

The following inferences can he drawn from this:

    a. Strong support from our own air units in the Norwegian area is, in the absence of aircraft carriers, an absolute prerequisite to successful operation in the Arctic Ocean. (Air reconnaissance is needed, even if it should be at the expense of the Atlantic Air Forces. Torpedo planes must be thrown into the fight.)

    b. In view of the enemy's determined stand, every operation in the Arctic Ocean involves the use of all our naval forces. This will be particularly necessary as long as there are enemy carriers.

    c. Therefore our own naval forces should be held back at first, in order to ensure their availability for repulsing enemy landing attempts. They should be committed only after the enemy's exact position and strength has been accurately and unequivocally ascertained by air reconnaissance, and when there is sufficient support by the Luftwaffe.

    d. The Luftwaffe must be ordered to wage relentless warfare against the enemy carriers. It must be the prime aim of naval air operations in the northern area to annihilate these carriers at sea and at their bases. Elimination of the aircraft carriers would basically improve our own chances.

    e. Work on our aircraft carrier must be accelerated. In this connection sufficient numbers of carrier planes must be provided. See Annex 2 for the attitude of the Führer.

    Everything must be done toward the early formation of a German task force composed of the TIRPITZ, the SCHARNHORST, one aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers and twelve to fourteen destroyers. It would be a serious threat to the enemy in the northern area and could be used very effectively.

B. The role assigned to the Navy in the event of an enemy landing is dealt with in Annex 1.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, requests that the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, receive instructions to reinforce the Luftwaffe in Norway. At the same time he should be informed of the purpose and the aims of aerial activity in that area.

The Führer approves.

C. Available ships. The HIPPER is ready to sail for Norway beginning 14 March. The stern of the PRINZ EUGEN is being rebuilt in Germany. The jury rudder will be completed in Trondheim in about six weeks. At that time the Baltic Sea will be sufficiently free of ice to permit the crossing. The SCHARNHORST will be ready in Kiel at the end of May. Three proposals are offered pertaining to the GNEISENAU. See Annex 3.

The LÜTZOW will be ready to sail in April. The KÖLN and NÜRNBERG need a thorough overhauling as the result of extremely hard and long service.

D. The POTSDAM and GNEISENAU will be ready about 10 April. It takes about two to three weeks for the installation of the degaussing gear.

3. The War in the West. Blockade runners. The ELSA ESSBERGER made port in France. For her cargo see Annex 4. Five ships homeward bound are: OSORNO, expected the middle of March; RIO GRANDE, beginning of April; FUSIJAMA, end of April; PORTLAND and MUENSTERLAN, middle of May. All are carrying rubber.

Departures: The TANNENFELS is about to depart. Later it will be possible to send ships to the Dutch East Indies for oil and tin.

4. The Mediterranean. A memorandum by the Naval Staff analyzes the situation in the Mediterranean. It urges that for strategic reasons the drive for the Suez Canal, if at all feasible, should be carried out this year, because of its far-reaching consequences. The favorable situation in the Mediterranean, so pronounced at the present time, will probably never occur again. The problem of shipping space for an attack on the Suez Canal can be solved. The Naval Staff is now attending to the details. The Navy cannot judge whether the Army has the necessary number of troops in readiness. The Naval Staff, however, thinks it desirable on the part of the Führer to issue orders that preparations for an offensive against the Suez Canal be begun. Above all, transports should be prepared.

In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, raises the question of the Italian transport submarines. See Annex 5.

The need for the occupation of Malta is pointed out. Advantage should be taken of the present state of its defenses, greatly weakened by German attacks. If Axis troops do not occupy Malta, it is imperative that the German Air Force continues its attacks on the island to the same extent as heretofore. Such attacks alone will prevent the enemy from rebuilding Malta's offensive and defensive capacities. If our attacks are not continued, the enemy will immediately and hurriedly begin to rebuild Malta. This would complicate the transportation of supplies to northern Africa.

What is the Führer's opinion on:

    a. The part Italy will play in the taking of Malta?
    b. The possibility of support by the German Air Force and Army?

The Führer knows the Duce's intention. He is afraid that the operation, evidently scheduled for July, will again be postponed. The German Air Force must give support. The Führer is inclined to undertake an offensive against the Suez Canal if the Air Force can remain intact in the Mediterranean. If it is used elsewhere, the offensive cannot be carried out. If Malta falls soon, it will greatly facilitate a Suez offensive. The Führer will discuss these questions with the Duce at their next meeting.

4a. Japanese bases on Madagascar. The Japanese have recognized the great strategic importance of Madagascar for naval warfare. According to reports submitted, they are planning to establish bases on Madagascar in addition to Ceylon, in order to be able to cripple sea traffic in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Bea. From there they could likewise successfully attack shipping around the Cape. Before establishing these bases, Japan will have to get German consent. For military reasons such consent ought to be granted. Attention is called to the fact, however, that this is a matter of great political significance, since it touches on the basic question or France's relation to the Tri-Partite Powers on the one hand, and the Anglo-Saxons on the other. Such action on the part of the Japanese may have repercussions in the French homeland, the African colonies, as well as in Portuguese East Africa.

It is important that Japanese officers report unofficially that Madagascar will be used only as bases for submarines and not for light or heavy naval forces.

The Führer is of the opinion that France will not give her consent.

5. The Black Sea. Beginning May, the following ships will be in the Black sea:

    3 German submarines, 250 tons each, assembled in Linz.
    6 PT boats.
    8 large motor minesweepers.
    4 small motor minesweepers.
    14 armed trawlers.
Italian ships:
    4 medium PT boats, 18 tons each, to be ready by the middle of March; they have a range of 350 miles at 42 knots, 850 miles at 8.5 knots.
Each is equipped with two torpedo tubes and one 2 cm gun. They are to be transported by rail as far as Vienna, and from there by water. An alternate route would be via the Rhone, Rhine, Danube.

In April and May, the following ships will be sent to the Black Sea:

    4 small motor boats, 3 tons each, with a range of 34 miles at 70 knots. Each carries a small torpedo and has a crew of two. They are to be transported by truck.

    6 small submarines, 34.5 tons each, with two 200 kg torpedoes. They have a surface speed of 7.5 knots. A submerged speed of 7 knots. They have a range of 600 miles at 7.7 knots, 1,400 miles at 5 knots. Their underwater range is 60 miles at 3 knots. Their endurance is from four to five days. They have a crew of four.

These small submarines are to be shipped partly by rail in special cars, partly by water via Save-Danube.

Rumanian submarines: The DELFINUL is ready for action. During the summer two more submarines will be added. These will be taken over and tested by German personnel. Later they will be operated by combined German-Rumanian crews.

6. Raw Materials. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on developments pertaining to naval construction etc. on the basis of Annex 6, and Supplements 1 to 4. Only a few of the particulars are stressed.

It appears that in 1944 only 15 (possibly only 12 to 13) submarines, one PT-boat and two motor minesweepers will be under construction. The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out that Minister Speer told him more cubic space is being allotted for commercial use than for military use, and that some of these contingents are assigned on the basis of former allocations without specifying for what purpose.

The Führer absolutely refuses to consider raising the contingents. He repeats again and again that it is impossible to allocate more space than there is. Available space inadequately utilized by certain agencies must be reallocated.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, suggests that he might re-examine the details with General Thomas, but the Chief of the OKW explains that this can be done only together with him. He states that the allocations of 5 March are only temporary.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, brings up the question of handing over fifty 2 cm guns to the Romanians as mentioned in Document Skl. Q.A.I. flak 3781 Gkdos of 9 March, issued by Quartermaster Division, Fleet Section of the Naval Staff. He asks that the OKW grant the Navy's requests as set forth in this document, since it appears that the Army and Luftwaffe have more facilities and raw materials at their disposal than they need. The Navy, on the other hand, inadequately provided for, has difficulty fulfilling the tasks assigned to it.

7. Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. The Commander in Chief, Navy, cites urgent reasons against the appointment of a Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. The Führer is in agreement. He says that the four-year plan is a monstrosity and states that he is definitely opposed to appointing a Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

8. In private conference, the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on the results of experiments with air compartments of underwater weapons.

signed: Raeder

Annex 1

The Role of the Navy in Repulsing Enemy Landing Attempts in Norway.

1. As soon as it becomes evident that the enemy is getting ready to attempt landing operations on a larger scale, all naval forces stationed in Norway will put to sea for the purpose of attacking the invasion fleet and annihilating it before a landing is attempted. If the invasion fleet cannot be completely destroyed, the damage inflicted should at least be so severe that the enemy has to turn back.

The success of this plan depends on how soon the invasion attempt is discovered and on the strength of the enemy. We must make no mistake about the fact that the enemy may use forces outnumbering ours by far. If however our reconnaissance is able to sight the invasion set en route, our naval forces have a good chance of being successful in spite of the enemy's superior numbers. Our torpedo boats and PT boats during the night preceding the landing could be particularly effective. In view of the participation of enemy aircraft carriers, our own naval forces need strong support from our Air Force.

2. If our Navy and Air Force do not succeed in preventing an enemy landing and the establishment of a beachhead, the Navy will use all available forces to strike against the enemy supply lines in order to prevent the enemy from bringing up and landing reinforcements. Such an attack against the supply lines should at least slow up matters sufficiently to give the Army the time needed to destroy the enemy forces on land. It is altogether feasible that the German naval forces assembled in Norway (including submarines), can accomplish this in cooperation with bomber and pursuit units of the Luftwaffe, even if the enemy should be very strong.

3. The prospects of success will depend a great deal on where the enemy will attempt to force a landing. Our naval forces will have a good chance of being successful in repulsing the enemy if he attempts landings in areas where we can concentrate the submarines and light surface torpedo carriers, (torpedo and PT boats) beforehand. Our own heavy ships, i.e. battleships and cruisers, will remain in areas in which the enemy is less likely to land, and will thus be safe from early elimination or blockade. Hence they will not be restricted in their actions against the enemy's invasion and supply forces and can attack from the outside.

It is impossible at this time to consolidate our light forces in areas that seem particularly endangered. As yet we have no definite information whatsoever indicating that the enemy has decided on one specific spot for an invasion. We may well expect that he will feign landings in several spots in order to confuse us and to split our defense forces. For the time being therefore our naval forces are distributed according to the importance of the respective areas. Two submarines each are assigned to Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik; there are six submarines in the Arctic region. These are to be reinforced by an additional four. Trondheim was chosen as the focal point for the surface forces. With the exclusion of Bergen, Trondheim is not only the strongest base but from the naval point of view also holds the key to the entire North Norwegian area. At present the TIRPITZ and the SCHEER are stationed there with five destroyers and two torpedo boats. After the arrival of the HIPPER, two more destroyers and five more torpedo boats in Trondheim, the SCHEER together with several torpedo boats is to be transferred to Narvik. Thus the strong and well balanced task force composed of the TIRPITZ and HIPPER with their own destroyers will remain in Trondheim. The SCHEER, which can put to sea on very short notice due to the special make of her engines, will protect the important Lofoten Islands from Narvik. The Narvik area will be further reinforced by a PT boat flotilla to be based at Svolvor. (The transfer of these boats has been delayed by ice conditions, but it is expected that six out of ten PT boats and an escort vessel will soon be able to set out for Svolvor.) PT boats are stationed in the Arctic region and along the West coast of Norway. To be more specific, four PT boats are stationed in the Arctic region, and three older PT boats in Bergen. The latter will be replaced by four newer and more effective PT boats as soon as ice conditions in our home waters permit.

4. According to the Naval Staff our naval forces stationed throughout the Norwegian area already have considerable defense value. Their mere presence makes large scale enemy invasion attempts a somewhat risky undertaking. At any rate the enemy will now have to use considerable forces in such an operation.

5. The numerous mine fields which were laid during the past weeks along all approaches to the Norwegian coastal inter-island route, undoubtedly have defense value. The enemy knows with certainty of the existence of these mine fields either through the establishment of danger zones or through his intelligence service. (So far approximately 1,650 mines have been laid. Work to complete and perfect these mine fields is in progress.)

The Führer is extremely worried that a surprise landing might be made in bad weather in the absence of air reconnaissance, and asks what the Navy could do under such circumstances. The Commander in Chief, Navy, replies that the Navy would likewise be unable to detect the approaching fleet in time because of the enormous sea expanses to be patrolled and the fact that our few ships cannot be at sea continuously in bad weather. In this connection the fuel shortage is another important factor. Furthermore, if we were to split our naval forces for the purpose of reconnaissance, they would readily be annihilated. Occasional reconnaissance operations by small naval forces off the heavily threatened northern coast could be considered.

Annex 2

Planes for Aircraft Carriers.

To provide the carrier with planes for experimental and training purposes, the Luftwaffe makes an initial assignment of the following types:

50 BF 109T pursuit planes.
4 Junker 87c dive bombers.
13 Fieseler 167 multiple purpose planes.
Total: 67 planes

This number of carrier planes will at best be sufficient for preliminary tryouts. It is not enough, however, to warrant the navy's efforts toward the completion of the aircraft carrier. In all probability no more planes will be available once the carrier, after its trial-runs, is put into service as part of the fleet. The Air Force believes, however, that it is impossible to continue building the above named types of planes.

Since the carrier is of decisive importance for the operation of our heavy ships, the suggestion is made that the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, should once more investigate whether it might not be feasible to convert current models into carrier planes or to order the development of new carrier planes.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, asks the Führer to instruct the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, to attend to the development and construction of carrier planes in sufficiently large numbers.

The Führer believes that the aircraft carrier is urgently needed and will direct the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, accordingly.

Annex 3

Refitting the Battleship GNEISENAU.

Investigation has revealed that the GNEISENAU could be refitted according to one of the following plans:

    1a. Refit with only two 28 cm turrets and repair of the bow in its present form is possible by 1 January 1943, the work to be done in the Deutsche Werke at Kiel.

    1b. Refit with only two 28 om turrets and repair of the how in its present form is possible by 1 April 1943, the work to be done in Gotenhafen.

    2. Refit with three 28 cm turrets with simultaneous rebuilding, i.e. lengthening of the bow, is possible by 15 November 1943, the rebuilding to be done in Gotenhafen. The repair and the installation of turret A determines the length of time required.

    3. Change of armament to three 38 cm turrets and simultaneously rebuilding i.e. lengthening of the bow by 1 February 1944, the work to be done in Gotenhafen.

The Führer approves the third plan. He orders that the two 28 cm turrets which are intact be used for coastal defense immediately.

Annex 4

Cargo of the ELSA ESSBERGER in Tons.

Tin ore
Tungsten ore
Wood oil
Coconut oil
Walnut oil
Shelled peanuts
Leather goods
Sole leather
Buffalo hides
Animal tallow
Dried egg yolk
Miscellaneous (gallnuts, duck feathers,
black bristles, kapok, etc.)


Annex 5

Italian Transport Submarines.

All endeavors of the Naval Staff to get larger numbers of submarines for transport purposes have failed. The Italian attitude is as follows:

    a. only two more submarines are to be converted for transport purposes in addition to the two now in operation.

    b. No Italian submarines are to be withdrawn from the Atlantic.

    c. Very little would be gained by using submarines for transport purposes.

The Naval Staff, on the contrary, is convinced that the use of numerous submarines for the purpose of carrying supplies to the very front lines, already of great importance now, will be particularly decisive in the event of a German offensive. Conversion of fourteen larger submarines now in the Mediterranean is possible at present. According to the computations of the Naval Staff, the Italians could raise the amount of supplies transported by submarines to at least 2,000 tons per month in the case of harbors right behind the front.

The request is made that the Führer broach the subject at the next meeting with the Duce.

The Führer consents to do this. He states that he had the Reichsmarschall call the Duce's attention to this urgent matter.

Annex 6

The construction program of the Navy determines the distribution of raw materials. After setting aside the raw materials needed for the maintenance, i.e. the repair of the ships in service, the surplus is used for the construction of new ships and for all other demands of the Navy. The ship construction program possible during the next few years is shown by supplements 1 and 2 entitled respectively "Ships to be Completed during 1942 and 1943" and "Construction of Major War Vessels in accordance with Führer's Orders." Column "a" shows the original plans drawn up on the basis of the tasks assigned to the Navy. Column "b" contains the changes necessitated by the cut in raw materials ordered last December. The construction plan extends over a period of years in order to make the most of the raw materials allotted. It is based on the supposition that the allotments for the next quarter periods will approximately equal the allotment announced in December for the first quarter of the year. Even though the number of new ships to be constructed had to be cut down below the strategic requirements, on the whole the Navy would still be able to carry out its major tasks, unless losses should be heavy. Under the circumstances however, there are no reserves for unforeseen happenings. Since the December order went into effect, the following has become apparent after careful study of the situation.

1. It is possible to carry out the planned ship construction program with minor curtailments. These will amount to one or two submarines per month, since the nonferrous metals required to build them are needed in other places where the quantity allotted has proven absolutely inadequate.

2. The needs of other departments of the Navy are met as follows:

    a. Artillery. It is barely possible to produce the planned amount of weapons, equipment and ammunition. The output of some types of ammunition will fall slightly short of the minimum required. The output for the second quarter will be more nearly adequate, since lack of coal and electricity slowed down production during the first quarter. If this output, which represents the minimum needed, is to be maintained, the allotment of nonferrous metals must be increased slightly at the beginning of the third quarter.

    b. Torpedoes. In view of the smaller number of submarines, the December allotment is sufficient to permit the production of the necessary number of torpedo tubes and torpedo setting equipment, as well as of 500 G7e and 400 G7a torpedoes. In this connection it must be noted that the production of 500 G7e torpedoes is assured only because of a cut in production during the first quarter. If the allotment of raw materials remains the same, the production of G7e torpedoes would by necessity drop down too low at the beginning of the third quarter.

    c. Mines. If the most urgent strategic demands for anti-mine equipment are met fully, the assigned amount of raw materials will be sufficient only to produce half of the mines needed, i.e. approximately 1,000 mines. In view of this limited output, our supply of mines will be exhausted soon if mines are used to any great extent. Here likewise the strategic needs of the future can be met only to a limited extent, unless the allotment of raw materials is increased.

    d. Navigation equipment. The raw materials set aside for this purpose, particularly copper, proved insufficient. The allotment for the second quarter had to be drawn upon during the first quarter in order to produce the needed number of gyro compasses. If all new ships are to be equipped with the most essential navigation apparatuses, the copper allotment must be nearly doubled.

    e. Construction of fortifications. The available raw materials are sufficient to take care of the construction necessary in 1942. No provision at all has been made however for the coastal and anti-aircraft batteries to be built in 1943. Unless provisions are made this year, these batteries will not be ready in time next year. Additional allotments of raw materials for coastal defenses are required to permit compliance with the Führer's orders.

    f. Living quarters, food, personal equipment. It is just about possible to produce equipment, temporary buildings, tin cans etc. in sufficient quantities. Because of insufficient copper and aluminum allotments, half of the buildings are without electricity and cooking facilities. Consequently they are not usable for the time being.

    g. Special-purpose motor vehicles, maintenance units, and similar equipment for temporary bases, submarine bases, etc. The quantity of raw materials allotted must be practically doubled, since the present quota is not nearly sufficient to fill the demand created by the transfer of equipment to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

    h. Medical service. The available raw materials for the first quarter are just about sufficient. It must be kept in mind however that during this time it was still possible to draw on existing supplies. If the Navy is maintained at its present strength, there has to be an increase in the allotment of copper and aluminum during the second quarter, in order to be able to provide the medical service with sufficient equipment.

This over-all survey reveals that copper and aluminum must be diverted to certain fields not directly connected with ship building, if our present Navy is to be kept in condition for carrying on effective warfare. As mentioned above, this can be done only at the expense of new ships, unless the allotments of these materials are higher for the second quarter than they were for the first.

3. On 5 March the OKW, War Economy and Armaments Division, announced the quantities of raw materials the Navy will probably receive for the second quarter. It is much less than the allotment for the first quarter. This reduction will have the following results: New ships: supplements 1 and 2, column "c" show that the number of ships and boats that can still be built is reduced to the point of military ineffectiveness. The number of submarines completed each month will be too small to replace even our losses resulting from the expected increase of anti-submarine warfare by the enemy. Thus the number of submarines at our disposal will gradually decrease. Attention is called to the fact that the figure fifteen is based on the supposition that only submarines of series VIIc and IXc are being built. Since, however, other boats, such as submarine tankers and long range U-boats, are likewise needed which require considerably greater amounts of raw material, the actual figure will drop to as low as 12 to 13 per month. As for surface vessels, only those can be completed which are in an advanced state of construction and for which the raw materials were previously allocated. By the end of 1943 the construction of all surface vessels must be stopped with the exception of one PT boat and two motor minesweepers per month. Even now the number of existing destroyers, torpedo boats and minesweepers (M-boats), etc. has proved inadequate. Thus, the construction of new ships will soon come to a complete stop if allotments of raw materials remain on the present level, and, taking into account the losses of the future, the time will come when we will no longer have the necessary ships for convoy and escort duty. As the result, submarine warfare and the shipment of supplies will suffer. Due to the fact that the size of the allotment of raw materials undergoes abrupt change every three months, part of these materials are tied up in ships which cannot be finished and have to be dismantled. For all practical purposes these materials are misapplied.

Supplement 3 gives a survey of the ships which can still be completed during 1942 and 1943, those on which work must be stopped because of lack of materials, and those which must be dismantled or on which work cannot even be begun. It is impossible to build any more new surface vessels during the next few years, for even if only fifteen submarines are built per month, these and the maintenance of the existing ships will use up all available raw materials.

The shortage of raw materials would affect other fields as follows:

    a. Artillery. The reduction of the monthly allotment from 700 to 210 tons was counteracted by careful utilization of other raw materials. Thanks to this, the strategic needs can just about be met during the first quarter. Any further cut, however, would be catastrophic. For example, in regard to ammunition, the greatest amount of copper goes into time fuses. Production of these would be reduced from 45,000 to 30,000. Therefore most of the ammunition needed would not be available. That is an impossible situation. We cannot permit the copper allotment to be cut.

    b. Torpedoes. Production of G7a torpedoes would drop from 480 to 200, and at the beginning of the third quarter the production of the G7e would also decline. Already the lack of the necessary number of G7a torpedoes jeopardizes the target practice program of the submarines. This is absolutely non-permissible.

    c. Mines. The allotted raw materials can be used either to make influence sweep gear only, or a small number of mines and depth charges. Either mine or anti-mine warfare would soon come to an end.

    d. Navigation equipment. Already previous allotments are entirely Inadequate.

    e. Construction of fortifications. Only 15 of the anti-aircraft batteries planned for 1942 can be equipped. The fifteen naval coast artillery batteries built cannot be completed.

    f. Living quarters, food and personal equipment. In addition to serious curtailments of food and living quarters, there would be a shortage of equipment for 78,000 men. Since this is the question of steel only, the problem could be handled by the Navy alone. Due to the shortage of nonferrous metals, a portion of the steel assigned for ship building purposes cannot be used.

    g. and h. Special-purpose motor vehicles, etc., and medical service. Previous allotments already proved insufficient. The copper and aluminum quotas would have to be increased at the expense of submarine construction.

4. In conclusion, the following is apparent:
    a. The allotments for the first quarter were not quite sufficient to fill the minimum military needs. If it is impossible to increase the quotas, raw materials intended for construction of submarines must be used for maintenance of the existing ships. As a result, one or two submarines less will be produced per month.

    b. If the allotment for the second quarter is 10% less than that of the first, the military needs can be filled only with definite limitations. It is doubtful whether the ships in service together with the few new additions can keep up submarine warfare and escort duty for any length of time.

    c. If the allotment is cut as indicated in the message of 5 March, it will be impossible for the Navy to carry out the tasks assigned. The present effectiveness of the Navy will be jeopardized; a gradual deterioration will take place during the next few years. Submarine warfare will gradually come to an end.

Supplement 1 to Annex 6


a. Original plan, needed for strategic reasons.
b. Curtailed plan.
c. Plan in view of the announced cut in raw materials.

Difference between number of ships to be built under original plan and of ships which can be built if raw materials are cut.

Supplement 2 to Annex 6


Supplement 3 to Annex 6



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