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Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to the Führer at Wolfsschanze in the afternoon of 13 November 1941.

Present: Chief of the OKW [Generalfeldmarschall Keitel]
General Jodl
Kapitän zur See von Puttkamer

1. Situation in home waters:

a. Norwegian area: The most important task is that of bringing up supplies and strengthening coastal defenses in the arctic area. Attacks by enemy submarines and planes harass supply traffic; lately the enemy has resorted to mine laying, from which it may be inferred that he no longer intends to take offensive action with surface forces off the fjords. In view of the length of the sea routes, the number of our own defense forces is very limited, taxing them heavily. The air forces at present available can protect normal convoy traffic only when the weather and visibility are favorable. So far, losses of transports have been slight because enemy activity has on the whole been less than expected. The long nights are favorable for convoys, as there is less danger of submarine attack.

In view of the very difficult transport conditions due to the season, coastal defenses can only be installed slowly. It is anticipated that construction of the batteries will be delayed due to weather conditions, the character of the terrain, and labor available. (See Annex 1.)

Submarine operations in the Arctic Ocean: The arctic night is unfavorable for submarines as it renders it difficult to locate the targets. Winter weather, with blizzards, storms, and fog, has an adverse effect. Air reconnaissance is lacking. It is difficult to attack the ships assembled in Iokanga Bay because of the powerful defenses and the prevailing currents. It is impossible to penetrate the west channel because of navigational difficulties, currents and depths, defenses, and the aerial mine situation. Coastal traffic is carried on with very small vessels, making attack more difficult. In view of our experiences so far and the difficult conditions, the operational possibilities of submarines in the Arctic Ocean should not be overestimated.

At present two submarines are operating; another is en route to the area, and a fourth is homeward bound. Present plans call for three boats to be in the operational area at all times.

b. Baltic Sea: The situation is unchanged. Mine sweeping is of primary importance in view of the extensive supply shipments. Traffic from Tallinn to Finland is proceeding as planned. The supply line for Tallinn is threatened by the enemy, who still occupies the island of Odensholm. Up to 10 Russian submarines are still at sea, but have achieved no successes so far, unless it was a submarine torpedo which hit U144. As winter sets in more and more, the possibility that the ships still able to operate might break through diminishes. Battleships are still heard in radio traffic, but are no longer able to operate. The cruiser MARTI and some destroyers are evidently still fully capable of operating. A few days ago a Russian group ventured as far as west of the Juminda barrage, where they suffered losses. The purpose of the operation is not known; possibly it was to prepare for the evacuation of Odensholm and Hangö. We have further reinforced the Juminda barrage. Now that ice is starting to form it is necessary to withdraw S-boats.

c. North Sea: The situation is unchanged.

d. Channel and Western area: The decided enemy air superiority in the Western Area has made the sea transport situation and the mounting threat to our defense forces more acute. In addition to attacks by planes and motor torpedo boats, the enemy is laying mines on a larger scale. (Recently mine fields were laid again off Boulogne and Lorient.) Utmost demands are made on the materiel and personnel of our inadequate escort forces; the physical and nervous strain on the men is very great. By using all available forces it has so far been possible to escort convoys and keep the routes open despite most difficult conditions. In the Western Area 139 convoys consisting of 542 vessels totalling 1,200,000 BRT were escorted during October. 18 planes were shot down during air attacks. Losses include 2 steamers and 1 dredger sunk, and 16 minesweepers, motor minesweepers, and patrol boats damaged, some severely. we cannot afford such losses. The construction of motor minesweepers is urgent for locating and sweeping mines and for anti-aircraft duties. The engine situation is causing difficulties.

There has recently been a sharp increase in air attacks on submarines entering and leaving port on the Atlantic coast.

The only way to relieve the situation at sea is to reinforce the fighter units of the Luftwaffe, an urgently needed step. According to information from the Luftwaffe, this is not possible for the time being.

2. Operations by surface forces:

a. TIRPITZ: It is intended to transfer the TIRPITZ to Trondheim in December as previously planned after she has been made ready for combat. A delay was caused by final repairs and additional installations to fit her for use in the Arctic Ocean. She will operate off the Norwegian coast as the situation may warrant.

The TIRPITZ cannot be sent into the Atlantic as previously intended because of the general oil situation, the enemy situation, and the need for her presence in the Northern Area.

b. Battleships at Brest: They will be ready for operations in February 1942. Careful review of the situation shows that fairly short operations and movements in the Atlantic are still practicable; there are good chances for success and for strategic effect, especially with regard to the Gibraltar convoys. The main difficulties are: Providing adequate training for the operations; bringing the ships safely in and out of the coastal waters; and assuring replenishment of supplies out in the Atlantic. To break through in the Iceland area is difficult and dangerous, and dangerous, but it appears feasible if it can be done as a surprise move and under favorable weather conditions. In view of the existing danger of air attacks it is not advisable to keep the ships at Brest after they are ready for combat, even though anti-aircraft defenses have become more effective since the introduction of smoke screens; the mere presence of the ships on the Atlantic coast forces the enemy to give his convoys stronger escort. We will not be able to use Spanish harbors in the near future.

In full consideration of the very difficult oil situation, the Seekriegsleitung has arrived at the following conclusions:

    (1) No lengthy operations against merchant vessels are to be undertaken in the Atlantic.

    (2) Prior to any operations, the combat readiness of the ships must be fully restored and adequate training provided.

    (3) When these conditions have been fulfilled, it can be decided whether the ships should operate off the French Atlantic coast in westerly or southwesterly direction against enemy north-south convoys, or whether steps should be taken to transfer the vessels to home waters or to the Norwegian area. The decision will depend on the enemy situation and the oil situation. The concentration of heavy surface forces in the Northern Area would force the enemy to maintain considerable naval forces in the North Scotland region, and would make it impossible to attack sea communications to northern Russia and enemy patrols in the Iceland-Faroes area.

    (4) It may be possible to bring the cruiser PRINZ EUGEN through the Channel.

    (5) It is proposed to make a final decision in January, as the situation keeps changing constantly: Japan may enter the war; the Spanish attitude may be changed by further successes in Russia.

The Führer agrees. He would like to use the ships for an operation against the Azores if this should become necessary - although at present such action is hardly likely. He inquires what the chances are for a surprise withdrawal of the ships through the Channel.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, replies that such a break-through by the PRINZ EUGEN is thought possible, but so far not for the battleships; the matter is to be further studied.

c. Cruiser SCHEER is ready for operations. The Seekriegsleitung requests permission for the ship to leave port in order to carry out cruiser warfare in the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. While fully realizing the difficulties involved in navigating the Iceland-Faroes Strait on her outward voyage, both the Seekriegsleitung and the Group Commanders recommend that the operation against merchant shipping should be carried out as planned; preparations are under way. The ship should leave port at the end of the week. Particularly in the present situation a powerful ship appearing in remote sea areas, especially the Indian Ocean, should have a very strong strategic effect. It would affect the supplies for the Middle East and the lively British transport traffic in the Indian Ocean; it would tie down British forces, have repercussions in the Mediterranean, and affect the British position in the Indian area.

If we wait for and utilize favorable weather conditions when there is no enemy air reconnaissance in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway, and if submarines and planes assist by making detailed reconnaissance and by reporting weather conditions, there is a very good chance of a successful break-through into the Atlantic. Prospect for the actual raiding operations must be considered good. Hence it is recommended to carry out the operation as planned. The risk of breaking through is great, of course; the ship has orders to turn back immediately if she thinks she has been detected.

As the Führer considers that the possible loss of the ship at present would be a heavy blow to prestige, and that the vital point at present is in the Norwegian Sea, he would rather see the SCHEER transferred to the Norwegian coast, i.e., Narvik or Trondheim.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, declares that the SCHEER is at a disadvantage because of her low speed as compared to that of the enemy's fast, powerful ships. Therefore she has to rely to a great extent on the bases.

d. Auxiliary cruisers: In view of the far-reaching effect of operations by auxiliary cruisers, the Seekriegsleitung still believes in using the vessels for warfare outside home waters despite the fact that operations are being made more difficult by enemy countermeasures and able direction of enemy shipping. As long as auxiliary cruisers are successful in sinking and capturing ships, it is justifiable and necessary to use them. This is still the case today as proved by recent gratifying results; among others two prize ships with rubber and other cargo are now en route to Germany.

Situation of Auxiliary Cruisers:

Auxiliary cruiser ship "45" [Komet] is at present in the North Atlantic. She will return to the Atlantic coast at the end of November.

Ship "16" [Atlantis] is at present in the South Atlantic. First of all she will replenish the supplies of our submarines there. She will return at the end of December.

Ship "41" [Kormoran] is at present in the Indian Ocean. She will return in Spring 1942.


Ship "10" [Thor] will be ready to leave port on 17 November; her area of operations will be the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

Ship "28" [Michel] will be ready to leave January or February 1942.

Ship "23" [Stier] will not be ready until February 1942.

Ship "14" [Coronel] will not be ready until Spring 1942.

The ships leave and return through the English Channel.

3. Directives for conduct of surface forces on encountering American forces (see Annex 2):

The aim of these directives is on the one hand to lessen the possibilities of incidents with American forces, and on the other to give the commanders clear guidance for their conduct when meeting U.S. naval forces; guidance which is in keeping with strategic necessity and which upholds the prestige and honor of the German flag. The directives represent the minimum required by the present naval situation. (Reference is made to the fact that the probability of encountering U.S. forces is very slight in any case, considering the choice of the zones of operation and the mission.)

The Führer approves these directives.

In reply to a question from the Commander in Chief, Navy, regarding the Führer's intention in case Congress repeals the Neutrality Law, the Führer stated that he would let the order stand that all merchant ships, including American ones, may be torpedoed without warning in the old blockade area. Further orders will depend on how the situation develops.

4. Merchant shipping overseas as of 13 November 1941:

a. Rubber transport:

    (1) Homeward bound: Three ships.

    Approx. position on 13 November 1941 Arrival Bordeaux
    BURGENLAND off Bahia early Dec. 41
    ELSA ESSBERGER in the southeast Pacific middle of Jan. 1942
    SPREEWALD in the southeast Pacific end of Jan. 1942

    Note: So far two ships carrying rubber have arrived from Japan; two have been lost.

    Special remarks: The rubber transport ODENWALD was stopped on 6 November by American naval forces in mid-Atlantic; she was scuttled by her own crew. According to orders the ship was flying the American flag, as this camouflage was the most suitable in view of the situation so far. It has been arranged with the Foreign Minister that in view of this fact no official protest shall be lodged with the U.S.A. The Seekriegsleitung has ordered other camouflage immediately for the ships in the sea area in question.

    (2) Outward bound:

    Approx. position on 13 November 1941 Arriving in Japan
    RIO GRANDE Pacific, near the Cook Islands early Dec. 41
    PORTLAND Atlantic, off Rio middle of Jan. 1942

b. Plans:
    (1) The following will leave Japan for Bordeaux:
    1 Ship in November 1941.
    1 Ship in December 1941.
    2 ships in January 1942

    In addition two Italian ships under Italian command will leave with a cargo for Germany and Italy. The length of the voyage will be two to three months in each case.

    (2) One ship will leave Bordeaux for Japan in January 1942

5. Submarine warfare: See Annex 3 for submarine disposition.

Submarine warfare on British imports in the Atlantic will be greatly reduced for a time after the boats now at sea have completed their missions, as tasks in the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are more urgent. The Seekriegsleitung is endeavoring to commit all remaining boats wholly for war on merchant shipping. Forces are tied down, however, by urgent escort and defense assignments in connection with returning prizes and blockade-runners. In addition there are delays in carrying out repairs because of labor shortage, so that returning boats need a very long time before they are ready for operations once more. Thus it is inevitable that fewer ships will be sunk, and the enemy supply lines are thus relieved.

At present all submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean are at Salamis and are in need of repair. Necessary overhaul is being delayed and made more difficult because the shipyards, repair facilities, and labor are inadequate. (One boat is now ready for operations.) No additional boats can be assigned to the Eastern Mediterranean until the base at Salamis has been appropriately prepared. La Spezia will be the main supply base for boats in the Western Mediterranean. Also Palermo and Maddalena can be used as emergency operational harbors.

The necessary steps have been taken to build up the submarine base at La Spezia.

Four boats have either passed Gibraltar or are getting ready to break through.

Plan: Later all Mediterranean submarines are to come under the German Admiral in Rome. An operational control organization is now being set up.

6. Conduct of the war in the Mediterranean:

As feared by the Seekriegsleitung since July, the situation regarding transports to North Africa has grown progressively worse, and has now reached the critical stage. It is pointed out that the Seekriegsleitung has always fully recognized the dangerous situation caused by British naval superiority in the Mediterranean, and constantly emphasized the need for speedy introduction of the proper German measures. (This point was raised in a personal conversation.)

Today the enemy has complete naval and air supremacy in the area of the German transport routes; he is operating totally undisturbed in all parts of the Mediterranean. Malta is constantly being reinforced. Patrols in the Strait of Gibraltar have been intensified, evidently as the result of German submarine operations. The Italians are not able to bring about any major improvements in the situation, due to the oil situation and to their own operational and tactical impotence. (When the British attacked the 51st Transport Squadron during the night of 8 November with only two light cruisers and two destroyers 140 miles east of Sicily, the enemy was not driven off and destroyed, in spite of an escort of six destroyers and the presence of two heavy Italian cruisers and another four destroyers; these were evidently too far off at the decisive moment.)

The Seekriegsleitung is deliberating what additional steps might be taken to aid the Italians immediately, such as sending them officers.

Recently the transport situation in the Aegean Sea has also greatly deteriorated. Enemy submarines definitely have the upper hand. German and Italian naval and air forces for patrol and escort duties and for planned anti-submarine measures are inadequate both in numbers and equipment, especially for the additional transport of men on leave, which is evidently considerable. There are constant shipping losses. The number of British submarines must be expected to increase, and thus the situation will become even more critical.

The Führer wants to have ships of about 1,000 BRT with a speed of 15 to 16 knots built in mass production in the Black Sea and Danube harbors, to be used as transports in the Mediterranean. They should be able to carry three to four heavy vehicles with personnel. These transports would proceed by day with adequate air cover; at night they could anchor behind nets in intermediate harbors or islands. In this way the risk would be divided.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on construction of merchant ships in Italy, Germany, and the occupied territories; merchant ships are needed everywhere because of the large amount of convoy traffic and the losses incurred. Collapse of our convoy traffic would be disastrous for the outcome of the war. There is a shortage of iron everywhere. The Ministry of Transportation cannot procure any; despite strong recommendations by the Naval High Command, allocation has not been granted. This transport program must have priority equal to the Army's transport program, which is also very important.

The Führer acknowledges this and instructed the OKW accordingly; he is also of the opinion that a certain amount of iron should be obtainable in the occupied Russian area in shipyards and ironworks. He recommends that an industrial expert should be appointed to examine the whole matter.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, will have this done. He reports on the possibility of building S-boats and motor minesweepers also in the Black Sea area. Shipyards are available, but they use only iron, hence the speed of the vessels is several knots less; this is not important, however. Iron and above all engines are needed; engines for S-boats and motor minesweepers are already scarce.

The question of transferring some S-boats to the Black Sea will be examined once more.

The Führer sanctions a meeting between the Commander in Chief, Navy, and Admiral Riccardi to discuss the problems connected with warfare in the Mediterranean.

7. The state of armament production for the Navy, and the labor situation: (See Annexes 4 and 5).

Due to the escort and patrol tasks which are far in excess of the Navy's capacity, the strain on its forces has almost reached the breaking point. In view of the growing importance of the Navy on all fronts, including the Mediterranean and Black Sea, it is essential to give the Navy an opportunity to build up considerably larger forces of men and material as soon as the situation in the east permits. Submarine repairs must be speeded up, S-boat and motor minesweeper construction must be increased, engines must be made available, and damaged escort vessels must be repaired.

The question of shipyard workers for submarine overhaul is especially pressing, as there are constant long delays in construction and repairs. It is urgently necessary that a special quota of German skilled workers be allocated to the Navy in addition to the foreign workers; at least 20,000 should be provided at once to relieve the most pressing need. It is requested that instructions be given to Minister Dr. Todt.

The Führer is aware of the Navy's critical position.

8. Oil situation: (See Annex 6).

9. Continued construction of the aircraft carrier:

The Seekriegsleitung still attaches great importance to continuing construction of the aircraft carrier. The first essential, however, is that the workers needed to finish the work and the planes required for carrier operations should be provided. The development of carrier planes would tie up considerable production facilities and involve great expense. The time factor involved with regard to the development of the new planes is extremely unsatisfactory. According to a report from the Luftwaffe, the new types of planes cannot be expected before the end of 1944 even under the most favorable circumstances. The planes formerly intended for carriers are available only in very small numbers. It is not possible to continue producing them now or later. The decision to develop a new type of carrier plane would create complications for the Luftwaffe, basically affecting its entire program.

In view of the effects on the Luftwaffe program the Seekriegsleitung thinks that their demands for continuing work on the aircraft carrier will have to depend on whether the Führer decides to make available the necessary manpower for the shipyards and to tolerate certain disadvantages for the current air armament program.

The Führer wants work on the aircraft carrier to be continued; he feels sure that the Luftwaffe will be able to help out with adapted planes at first.

10. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on the special ships designed by Engelmann and Walter. (See Annexes 7, 8, and 9.)

11. In a private talk the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on the importance and prospects of mine warfare.

He also recommends the posthumous award of the Oakleaf Cluster of the Knight's Cross to Captain Krüder, the commander of the auxiliary cruiser PINGUIN, for outstanding services in cruiser warfare.

The Führer agrees.

signed: Raeder

countersigned Assmann

Annex 1

Coastal Guns.

1. Northern Norway:

a. With reference to difficulties in construction during the present season, see the communication from the Commanding Admiral, Norway, 3508/41 Gkdos. dated 25 October 1941; a copy was sent to Commander Junge so that he can inform the Führer and the Chief of the OKW when the opportunity arises.

b. Guns to be added to the coastal defenses already provided:

    (1) Three 28 cm. guns, formerly intended for operation "Felix", are to be sent to Vadsø (Kiberg).

    (2) Four 24 cm. guns, from the "Skagerrak" battery on Sylt, are to be sent to Kirkenes.

    (3) Four 15 cm. guns, formerly intended for operation "Felix", are to be sent to Petsamo.

c. Steps to be taken in connection with "b":

After considerable initial difficulties in obtaining a construction battalion from the Army, as the result of a conference the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, was finally commissioned by the OKW with carrying out the work according to instructions from the Navy. He will use construction squads already in his area. In addition the Navy is furnishing one of its own construction companies from the North Sea area: Company 2 of Construction Battalion 323.

The advance detachment of this company, composed of one officer and twenty four petty officers and men, has already left via the Oulu-Petsamo land route. The remainder of the company, i.e., four officers and 250 petty officers and men, will leave Kiel about 15 November for Oulu, from there to follow the land route to Petsamo. At about the same time the steamer KORITYBA will leave Kiel and proceed to Petsamo by sea with barracks, building materials, foundation sections, etc. The guns, special vehicles, ammunition, etc., will go by rail as far as Mosjøen or Trondheim and thence by ship to Petsamo or Kirkenes at a date to be fixed later according to the state of construction. The battery crews will be sent last of all via the Oulu-Petsamo route shortly before the batteries are ready for use.

2. Western Norway:

Guns to be added to the coastal defenses already provided:

a. Four 17 cm. guns, from the “Yorck" battery in Pillau, are to be sent to Honigsvaag (North Cape).

b. Three 17 cm. guns, from the "Von der Goeben" battery in Pillau, are to be sent to Harstad.

c. Four 15 cm. guns, from the "Brommy" battery in Memel, are to be sent to Arno (Tromsø).

d. Four 24 cm. railway guns (captured French) are to be sent to Narvik, to relieve two 28 cm. railway guns belonging to the Army.

Remarks on "a" to "c": The batteries are being dismantled at their previous locations; transport facilities are being prepared.

Remark on "d": The guns have not yet been put in order.

3. Southern Norway:

The first gun of the "Kroodden" battery at Christiansand-South, is being mounted; the second gun is also to be set up during the winter. Later the battery is to have four instead of two 38 cm. guns.

4. The Channel coast including the Channel Islands:

Guns to be added to the coastal defenses already provided:

a. Three 40.6 cm. guns, from the "Schleswig-Holstein" battery at Hela, are to be sent to Calais.

b. Four 30.5 cm. guns, formerly intended for operation "Felix", are to be sent to Guernsey.

c. One heavy battery for the northwest tip of Normandy and one for the northeast tip of Britanny have been requested from the Army; after the Black Sea operations are completed the "Tirpitz" battery, with three 28 cm. guns, is to be transferred from Constanta to the northeast tip of Britanny to release one of the two Army batteries.

Remarks on "a" and "b": The preliminary work for dismantling has been commenced and construction begun.

Remark on "c": The Army has not yet replied.

5. Western France:

Guns to be added to the coastal defenses already provided:

a. Three 15 cm. guns, from the "Oxhöft" battery in Gotenhafen, are to be sent to Brest.

b. Four 34 cm. railway guns (captured French) are to be sent to St. Nazaire, in exchange for the two 24 cm. railway guns there at present.

c. Four 24 cm. railway guns (captured French) are to be sent to Lorient.

Remarks on "a": Dismantling has been started.

Remarks on "b" and "c": The battery positions are being prepared.

6. Atlantic Islands:

Four medium batteries have been set up on Tenerife and Grand Canary with the assistance of a small German construction detachment and are ready to fire. (One battery of three 17 cm. guns and one battery of three 15 cm. guns were installed on each of the two islands.) Our offer of a training detachment with one officer for each island was not accepted by Spain for reasons of prestige; hence at the request of the Naval Attaché, Madrid, the detachments were not furnished "because of our own urgent need".

Annex 2

Directives for conduct of surface forces when encountering American naval forces.

1. Use of arms against American naval and air forces:

Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought deliberately; they are to be avoided as far as possible. Efforts to avoid incidents are to be abandoned, however, as soon as the American forces, endanger our naval forces or other ships under our control, as supply ships or prizes, by shadowing them, for instance. In such a case the commander has the right to resort to arms in self-defense, and it is then his duty to be sure he is not too late in using his weapons. He is to try to destroy the enemy.

Examples: Whether and to what extent the cruiser must make use of this right to use arms depends on what kind of U.S. naval forces are encountered and on the tactical and operational situation. It is not possible to foresee every possible situation and to lay down inflexible rules:

a. As soon as a U.S. warship or plane begins to use its weapons, full use of weapons is naturally sanctioned in every case; action is to be taken according to the tactical situation.

b. Encounter with a plane: Weapons must be used as soon as the plane is within anti-aircraft range and approaches the ship in such a way that it could attack, or if it shadows the ship. The need for prompt use of weapons is emphasized by the facts that the British use the same types of aircraft as the Americans, and that it is not generally possible to identify the nationality at once.

c. Encounter with a slow warship, as a submarine, gunboat, or auxiliary vessel: By reason of her superior speed the cruiser will be able to elude the encountered vessel promptly.

d. Encounter with a faster, possibly superior naval vessel, i.e., an aircraft carrier or destroyer: If the operational situation permits, the cruiser can try to shake off the enemy by utilizing her high continuous speed, poor visibility, or darkness. If she does not succeed in ridding herself of the enemy in this way, or if the situation does not permit any such attempt, while at the same time the enemy is evidently trying to maintain contact, she must resort to use of weapons. A short, if possible visual signal to the enemy may be expedient, asking him for example his course or port of destination or requesting him not to shadow the cruiser; but the cruiser is not obliged to do this.

The Führer states that if an American warship tries to stop an auxiliary cruiser in order to search her, the latter can assume that the occasion warrants action in self-defense (e.g., a surprise torpedo fired when a prize crew comes on board).

e. Sudden encounter at night, or during poor visibility or fog: In general it will not be possible to identify the nationality promptly when suddenly encountering a warship sailing without lights at night.

If it is known or can be assumed from the situation that it is a U.S. warship, the German vessel must attempt to withdraw. However, in case of sudden danger where it is impossible to withdraw, the commander has the right and the duty to use his weapons instantly in self-defense to ward off immediate danger.

If there are no definite grounds for assuming that the ship is American, procedure is to be as though she were a British warship.

In fog and poor visibility the ships are to conduct themselves accordingly.

f. Enemy use of radio: The mere use of radio by American forces is not sufficient grounds for attack, unless the situation is such that the safety of our ship is endangered by such use.

g. Convoys escorted by U.S. forces: If it is observed before a convoy is attacked that it is being escorted by American forces, the attack is not to be carried out. If the fact that the escort of the convoy is composed of American forces is not noticed until after the cruiser has attacked the convoy, the action need not be broken off for this reason alone.

2. Treatment of the crews of American forces:

Survivors are to be picked up only if this is possible without endangering our own ship. Survivors are to be treated as prisoners of war.

Annex 3

Disposition of Submarines as of 10 November 1941.

1. Total: 220 boats have been commissioned. 84 of these are operational boats, 55 training boats, and 79 are undergoing trials.

2. Of the operational boats 57 are at sea. These are distributed as follows:

    a. North Atlantic: 38; of these, 22 are in the zone of operations (Greenland area 8; northeast of the Azores 9; Iceland area 3; Newfoundland area 2). 3 are outward bound, and 13 are returning home.

    b. South Atlantic: 5, one of them outward bound.

    c. Arctic coast: 4.

    d. Eastern Mediterranean: 6 (at present these are at Salamis for overhauling.) One boat is ready for operations.

    e. En route to the western Mediterranean: 4; one of these boats is off Gibraltar on 10 November; one boat is to be at the Strait of Gibraltar on 12 November; two outward-bound boats are off Cape Finisterre.

The remaining boats needed to bring the total up to nine in the Eastern and to twelve in the Western Mediterranean according to present plans, will follow as they become ready for operations.

On 10 November, 27 of the operational boats were in port as follows:

    5 at Kiel.
    10 at Lorient.
    7 at St. Nazaire.
    5 at Brest.
3. Losses up to 10 November: 51.

Annex 4

Labor for Naval Production.

The labor situation for the Navy has steadily deteriorated. The allocations of workers, which to be sure had fallen off during the summer but still provided a monthly increase in personnel of several thousand men, have steadily decreased, so that according to data from the OKW the personnel decreased by 7,000 in September. (10,000 men, mainly foreign workers, were allocated, while 17,000 men left.)

On the other hand the Navy requires the following additional labor (these figures have been submitted to the OKW and to the Minister of Munitions):

up to 31 Dec. 41
to complete project

Most important armament works

Remaining armament works
(statistics compiled by the OKW)













59,000 17,000 15,500 91,500

The decrease in personnel is felt even more because the allocations consist largely of foreign workers and prisoners of war. Prospects for improvement are considered everywhere to be very unfavorable (by the Minister of Munition, the Minister of Labor, and the OKW). There are constant new drains on labor through special orders and special levies, which affect severely the most vital naval war production and are very difficult to eliminate.

Special measures must be undertaken to make up the shortage of manpower in naval production; these should be similar to the measures put into effect for the Luftwaffe, or to the special directives covering other types of production. The Navy has adjusted itself to covering the shortage to a large extent by using foreign workers and prisoners of war, including a large proportion of Russian prisoners. Despite this, it is absolutely essential that half the shortage (45,000) as well as all losses of German workers due to natural causes should be made good with German workers.

Annex 5

Raw Materials for Naval Production.

Given in tons per month.

New tasks have not been allowed for. (Transports to Northern Norway and the Canary Islands; construction and repair of merchant vessels.)

Annex 6

Consumption of Fuel Oil.

Group I November December January
a. Entire submarine service including escort vessels and recovery vessels 12,000 tons 12,000 tons 12,000 tons
b. Vessels belonging to mine sweeping and escort formations, and motor minesweepers Type 35 10,000 tons 10,000 tons 10,000 tons
c. Italian convoy forces in the Aegean Sea 3,000 tons 3,000 tons 3,000 tons
d. Auxiliary cruisers 2,000 tons
27,000 tons
2,000 tons
27,000 tons
2,000 tons
27,000 tons
Group II
a. Destroyers on operations 15,000 tons 18,000 tons 18,000 tons
b. Torpedo boats on operations 10,000 tons
25,000 tons
12,000 tons
30,000 tons
12,000 tons
30,000 tons
Group III
Nucleus fleet (including training of cruisers) 10,000 tons 20,000 tons 30,000 tons
Group IV
a. Shipyards and testing purposes 3,000 tons 3,000 tons 3,000 tons
b. Supply ships 1,500 tons
4,500 tons
1,500 tons
4,500 tons
1,500 tons
4,500 tons
Group I 27,000 tons 27,000 tons 27,000 tons
Group II 25,000 tons 30,000 tons 30,000 tons
Group III 10,000 tons 20,000 tons 30,000 tons
Group IV 4,500 tons
66,500 tons
4,500 tons
81,500 tons
4,500 tons
91,500 tons
To be provided for supplying northern Norway 23,500 tons
90,000 tons
18,500 tons
100,000 tons
8,500 tons
100,000 tons

Fuel and Diesel oil situation in the German and Italian Navies.

1. Fuel Oil:
The total stock of the German Navy is as shown in the attached chart. Of this about 220,000 tons are ready for use; the remainder must be thinned, mainly by the addition of lignite fuel oil (monthly output 12,000 tons) and Rumanian fuel oil. 380,000 tons, distributed in 70 bases.
The total stock of the Italian Navy is 30,000 tons at 30 bases.
Total: 410,000 tons
Requirements in November 90,000 tons
Monthly requirements of German Navy 100,000 tons from December on
Monthly requirements of Italian Navy 100,000 tons
Total monthly requirements 200,000 tons
Additional monthly supplies for the German Navy beginning 1 November:
a. German home production:
b. Rumanian imports:
c. Rumanian imports for the Italian Navy:
50,000 tons
7,000 tons
27,000 tons
Total monthly supplies: 84,000 tons
Hence the shortage in November is 116,000 tons

In view of the decision of the Chief of the OKW with regard to handing over another 30,000 tons of fuel oil to the Italian Navy, the following steps have been taken:

    a. 10,000 tons of fuel oil have been ordered transferred from the Gotenhafen area to La Spezia.

    b. 20,000 tons of fuel oil have been ordered transferred from the area of western France to La Spezia.

2. Diesel oil:

No requests for Diesel oil have been received from the Italian Navy.

Available stock of the German Navy, 106,000 tons, at 70 bases.
Imports in November 45,000 tons
Imports from December on 40,000 tons

With a monthly consumption of about 14,000 tons for submarines, which will rise to 20,000 tons by January and then continue to increase by 2,000 tons each month, requirements of Diesel Oil can at present be covered by imports. Additional requirements for surface forces and supply vessels amount to the following:

    25,000 tons in November.
    15,000 tons in December.
    15,000 tons in January.
Distribution of Stocks of Fuel According to Commands.

Annex 7

State of Experiments with the Engelmann Ship.

Engelmann's ship was primarily intended as an exceptionally fast mail and dispatch vessel to ply between Europe and America.

The average speed required for this purpose was to be achieved mainly by the fact that she would be able to maintain her speed even in heavy seas.

Towing trials also resulted in a very satisfactory graph of the speeds that could be reached with the special semi-submerged form of the vessel.

The first experiments with a small boat indicated that the theoretical possibilities were practicable.

A vessel was therefore constructed weighing not quite 300 tons with four S-boat Diesel engines. Allowance was made in weight but not in space for the installation of torpedo equipment because MAN Diesel engines (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg - Nürnberg) which were available had to be used.

The following questions were to be clarified with the experimental vessel:

    1. Can the favorable results attained in the trials be duplicated in actual practice?

    2. Is the speed really unaffected by heavy seas?

    3. Are the misgivings concerning the longitudinal stability because of the small freeboard justified?

So far, experiments have shown that good results may be expected on all points. It will soon be possible to finish the tests.

At higher speeds, however, the following became evident:

As the vessel has only one screw and no structural stability because of the almost complete absence of freeboard, the torque of the screw causes e list, which at higher revolutions may amount to 13 degrees. As the rudders then begin to act as hydroplanes, the highest speed possible has not yet been reached. So far, approximately 28 knots is the highest speed attained.

However, from the results with the test craft it can be assumed that a boat with two screws would fulfill the requirements and at the same time the list would be reduced. The turning circle of the test boat is too large.

Presumably it will be possible to arrive at a PT boat capable of operating in stormy weather if the vessel is enlarged by about 100 tons. There seem to be no other possibilities for employing this type of vessel in the naval building program. Engelmann considers that a 4,000 ton type would be successful as a blockade-running merchantman.

Annex 8

Special characteristics and results achieved with "V 80".

1. This is a submarine with a single engine for both surface and underwater travel and with exceptionally high submerged speed.

2. The hull is streamlined to the greatest possible degree.

3. The vessel is steered by a joy stick similar to that of a plane.

4. By utilizing dynamic forces, the submarine can travel both submerged and surfaced without perfect trim (except at very low speeds).

5. Performance submerged:

achieved desired
Estimated speed: 23 knots (probably more) 28 knots
Screw revolutions: 885 per minute 1,000 per minute
Power: 1,500 HP 2,000 HP

6. Sea-going characteristics: The boat is steady in rough seas, and does not dip. She is easily steered when submerged and responds very quickly.

Annex 9

Special characteristics of "V 300" (as planned).

1. This is a submarine built generally on the principle of existing boats, but with a special propulsion unit for high submerged speed.

    a. This consists of two turbines totalling 4,000 HP which do not leave a bubble track.

    b. Electric motors are also provided for crawling.

    c. The propulsion unit for surface cruising consists of two Diesel engines totalling 600 HP.

2. Joy stick, dynamic diving and surfacing, and sea-going characteristics are the same as in "V 80".

3. The bridge is enclosed with plexiglas to achieve the fullest possible streamlining.

4. Estimated performance:

    a. submerged:
    speed: 19 knots.
    Endurance at maximum speed: 19 knots for 205 miles.
    Endurance at cruising speed: 10 knots for 450 miles.

    b. surfaced: 9.3 knots for 3,500 miles.


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