A. Use of the Kriegsmarine in the war against Russia:

a. The Arctic Ocean: (See Annex 1). Evidently Convoy PQ18 did not sail. We can thus assume that our submarines and planes, which totally destroyed Convoy PQ17, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily or even to fundamentally change his whole system of supply lines. Supplies to northern ports of Russia remain decisive for the whole conduct of the war waged by the Anglo-Saxons. They must preserve Russia's strength in order to keep German forces occupied. The enemy will most probably continue to ship supplies to northern Russia, and the Seekriegsleitung must therefore maintain submarines along the same routes. The greater part of the Fleet will also be stationed in northern Norway. The reason for this, besides making attacks on convoys possible, is the constant threat of an enemy invasion. Only by keeping the Fleet in Norwegian waters can we hope to meet this danger successfully. Besides, it is especially important in view of the whole Axis strategy that the German "fleet in being" tie down the British Home Fleet, especially after the heavy Anglo-American losses in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The Japanese are likewise aware of the importance of this measure. In addition, the danger of enemy mines in home waters has constantly increased, so that the naval forces should be shifted only for repairs and training purposes.
The Führer voices agreement and stresses the danger from mines to ship traffic to and from Norway.

b. The Baltic Sea: The particular type of warfare in the Gulf of Finland permits only the use of very small vessels. The most effective weapon for this region has proved to be the mines. Actions of the Russian fleet which were expected on a larger scale did not materialize due to mines. Only 2 or 3 submarines broke through into the Baltic, compared to at least 20 which were destroyed in trying to reach it. The conquest of Leningrad would terminate naval warfare in that region. This would improve the situation greatly for the Seekriegsleitung and it would free forces for sea and coastal defense. To be sure, the number of Baltic forces which would become available is small; nevertheless it is of importance considering the growing lack of manpower on the one hand and the constant expansion of our sphere of influence on the other hand. Furthermore if we could eliminate the mines in those regions where a blockade would no longer be needed, we could greatly expand the training area in the Baltic Sea in summer 1943. This is especially important, since the western part of the Baltic can hardly be used at all for training purposes because of mines.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, requests a directive that the shipyards in Leningrad be spared shelling and air attacks and not be destroyed with the city for obvious reasons. (See Annex 2.)

The Führer declares that such systematic sparing of the shipyards is possible in the case of artillery but not in connection with air raids; however air raids never achieve complete destruction of docks in any case. The Führer will take the Navy's request into account, although he is of the opinion that the Russians will destroy the docks themselves.

c. The Black Sea: we are still handicapped by lack of forces so that the main share of sea fighting has to be done by the Air Force. We intend to strengthen our forces with additional submarines, even though we hope that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be put out of action by October or November. Submarines will remain important in the future when the Black Sea is used as a training area. Four units were added to the S-boat flotilla, but the motors could not yet be furnished. The minesweeper flotilla is to be reinforced by four boats. These forces afford only minimum protection of our supply routes against mines and Russian forces. Considerable losses in the Sea of Azov were caused especially by Russian mines. Further losses will be incurred in trying to put the ports acquired into navigable condition, always keeping in mind the fighting tenacity of the Russians. The Seekriegsleitung therefore stresses the importance of great caution in the use of all valuable and irreplaceable transport vessels. This applies especially to the small number of steamers still available, which for the present cannot be replaced. In the opinion of the Seekriegsleitung the only risks that should be taken are in using landing barges (MFP) in cases where Army operations depend on reinforcements by sea. Landing barges are replaceable.

The Italian submarines and submarine chasers (MAS) proved their worth in the Black Sea. Unit and boat commanders showed great daring.

The only vessels which can be sent to the Caspian Sea at the moment are coastal mine layers (KM-Boot) and Italian units of the type used in the Black Sea. No final conclusions on how to transport the vessels have been reached. In the Caspian Sea we will be confronted with an enormous Russian superiority, since all our equipment must be brought by land.

Our 3 submarines for the Black Sea will not be ready until October when they may be used for training purposes. To a large extent however, we have to use the Black Sea as a training area because of mines in the Baltic.

The Führer considers the submarines in the Black Sea important because they will have a very favorable political influence on Turkey. He suggests that 6 submarines for this reason be transferred there. The Commander In Chief, Navy, agrees.

B. The war against England and the United states.

When our aim in the East, namely the creation of a blockade-proof "lebensraum" is achieved, we must still fight the naval war against the Anglo-Saxons to an end. The only way to bring them to terms is by constant successful attacks on their sea routes.

1. Submarine warfare:

a. The enemy transportation system in American waters underwent great changes, as the Seekriegsleitung predicted and expected even sooner. The Americans abandoned individual ship movements off their eastern coast and adopted convoy formation. They have considerably strengthened their defenses, particularly in the air. Only occasionally will submarines operate and mine harbor entrances in this area. Some individual ship traffic still takes place in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; the enemy has just started to organize convoys there. He has increased his defenses there too, however. Accordingly submarine attacks in these areas must be focused on points where the largest number of ships, not sailing in convoys, has been observed; and where ships are expected to sail alone.

b. Recent submarine attacks were determined by the change in the enemy's transportation system and the increasing difficulty of operating along the American Coast. At the same time, the satisfactory increase in delivery of new operational submarines from home (22 in July and 26 in August) enabled us to resume convoy attacks by stationing one or two submarine groups in the northern and middle parts of the North Atlantic. The favorable results of these operations indicated that opportunities for attack are not much worse than before as long as the convoy remains beyond the range of plane protection.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out on the map the range within which British planes based at home can protect their convoys. The Ju 88, available for this operation, covers considerably less distance; the He 177 exceeds the flying-range of the Ju 88 by three hours (see Annex 3). He therefore requests immediate assignment of He 177 planes instead of the Ju 88 for submarine defense. Recently our submarines have suffered heavy losses because of the superior location finding devices on English aircraft (4 submarines sunk in the Bay of Biscay, 3 damaged, 4 more damaged in contact with convoys, some badly).

The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that German submarines have been equipped with radar interception sets (FuMB) since 8 August 1942 and this device and the deception devices (Bolde) have shown some favorable results.

The Führer recognizes the need for the best possible planes to support the submarines, but he makes no definite promises.

c. The Seekriegsleitung considers it particularly effective to launch submarine attacks at several places simultaneously. The constantly increasing number of operational submarines offers such possibilities. Besides stationing several submarines in the Natal Passage and off Freetown, we have started an operation of some importance off Capetown with four submarines and a submarine tanker. We plan first to send two submarines into the roadstead of Capetown and follow up with four more outside the harbor.

d. Submarine operations in Norway: In order to attack the expected PQ convoys at the earliest possible opportunity, two submarines were assigned to patrol the Denmark Straits North of Iceland. Seven other submarines are now involved in operation "Scheer". As other submarines become available for action, they should be held ready at their bases until the PQ convoy has been located.

e. Submarine operations in the Mediterranean: In addition to the 4 submarines operating in the eastern Mediterranean, there should always be 2 or 3 others assigned to the western Mediterranean in order to attack the supply lines between Malta and Gibraltar (at present 2 boats are on duty in this area).

f. Losses (see Annex 4): Recent submarine losses were higher than we expected. We lost 3 in June and 9 in July, and we must count on an additional loss of 8. These losses are partly due to strong enemy air forces in the Bay of Biscay.

Ship 10 (Gumprich): Sunk to date: Ship 28 (Ruckteschell): Sunk to date: Ship 23 (Gerlach): Sunk to date:

Indian Ocean 10 ships of 56,000 BRT. Atlantic Ocean 9 ships of 60,000 BRT Atlantic Ocean 4 ships of 22.000 BRT

At the beginning of October we plan to send a fourth auxiliary cruiser (Ship 45) into action.

Movements of the Scheer: The Commander in Chief, Navy, shows on map the movements of the SCHEER (operation "Wunderland") in the Arctic Ocean. He also gives the reasons why it is desirable to send her to the South Atlantic in November 1932 for attacking merchant ships. (Reference: 1.Skl. l434/42, Gkdos.Chfs, dated 1 August 1942.) The chances for success are very favorable, and the operation should have important political and psychological effects. Our chief difficulty lies in breaking out of home waters into the Atlantic.

The Führer expounds at length why he wishes to keep all larger units available for operations in the North until further notice. (They discourage landing attempts; there is limited air reconnaissance in winter; the coast is insufficiently fortified, etc.) He therefore decides not to dispatch the SCHEER to the Atlantic this winter.

3. Mediterranean Sea: The opinion of the Seekriegsleitung regarding the importance of the capture of Malta remains unaltered.

We have no further comment on the strategic significance of operations against Egypt, especially in view of the operations in progress in the Caucasus.

The capture of Gibraltar remains a most desirable objective for the future. It is particularly important to seal off the Mediterranean completely in case a long-drawn-out war requires us to secure our European "lebensraum" as thoroughly as possible.

We now have 15 submarines in the area. Heavy damage was again caused by enemy bombers. Our S-boats are to be reinforced by an eight boat flotilla in October. No further additions are possible since we have no more boats of the small type that can pass down the Rhone River.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, continues to regard a possible attempt of the Anglo-Saxons to occupy Northwest Africa and get a foothold in North Africa with the aid of the French as a very great danger to the whole German war effort. They would attack Italy from there and endanger our position in Northeast Africa. Therefore Germany must maintain a strong position in the Mediterranean and must above all have unquestionable domination over Crete. By the same token, we cannot afford to relinquish Piraeus and Salonika.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out in detail, with reference to 1. Skl. I b 1381/42, Top Secret, dated 28 July 1942, why Crete must remain in German possession in peace as well as in war.

The Führer concurs in this opinion and states that he wants to replace those troops which have been withdrawn from Crete. For the present he has no intention of giving it up. He does not conceal his increasing dissatisfaction with the Italians and alludes to plans which he is not yet able to discuss.

II. Concentration of our air attacks on destroying the largest possible amount of cargo space.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, requests that our air attacks against England be concentrated on ships in port and on the ways. (Colonel Koller's photos of harbors filled with ships are shown.) In this way, our attacks would have a real influence on the outcome of the war, which they certainly do not have at present.

The Führer stresses the strong defenses of such harbors but acknowledges the wisdom of such a procedure. He hopes for an improvement in the situation through the use of high altitude bombers which are being delivered now.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, again points out how dangerous it is to have large airfields in the vicinity of important objectives on the coast since enemy airborne troops have easy access to them. The Führer states that the Air Force reported all fields are now sufficiently protected by 2 cm guns.

III. New destroyers 1942 model (Flottentorpedoboote 42), and Walter submarines (see Annex 5).

The Commander in Chief, Navy, using a sketch, reports on the design of the new destroyer, 1942 model, and the Walter submarine. He urges that construction of V-engines for the new destroyers be expedited since the first engine will not be ready for testing until the spring of 1943. This means that the first new destroyer will not be completed until 1945. The Führer promises support.

IV. In discussing anti-aircraft guns, the Führer wishes that the relative value of the 12.7 cm gun on destroyers and of the 10.5 cm twin mount anti-aircraft gun be established.

The 12.8 cm guns on the anti-aircraft towers in Berlin have interchangeable shells. They have fixed platforms, however, and do not need triple axes.

V. The Führer gives permission to use the 20 cm turrets of the Seydlitz for coastal fortifications on the western front. The Seekriegsleitung, Quartermaster Division, suggests possible locations. It also mentions the possibility of converting the DE GRASSE at St. Nazaire into an aircraft carrier rather than a ship of the SCHARNHORST class. Tests are still being made, especially in regard to the engines.

VI. The Führer inquires about the labor problem. Minister Speer said that it is impossible to take the 8,400 workers out of the munitions industry, substituting foreigners. The Führer considers this move necessary nevertheless. The Commander in Chief, Navy, suggests looking into the possibility of obtaining skilled shipyard workers from the Todt Organization.

VII. Private conversation between the Führer and the Commander in Chief, Navy.

The Commander in Chief, Navy believes that the decision to build more battleships will have to await the outcome of the naval war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons, because the battleship has not yet had a chance to prove its worth in action. In any event, it would probably be wise to prepare the design of a battleship equipped with guns of the largest possible caliber, despite the fact that more experience and future developments might require us to design smaller warships with new weapons, such as remote control glide bombers fired from catapults, perfected remote control rockets, etc. We must also work out plans for large aircraft carriers and cruisers with flight decks, better protected than ever before. These are now in progress. The Führer agrees with this opinion. He instructs the Commander in Chief, Navy, to find out from the Krupp firm which artillery caliber (45 cm, 50 cm, or 53 cm) would give the best performance technically and tactically for the largest usable ships This should be the basis for designing the ship.

Since the ship must have a high freeboard, the 15 cm guns could probably be mounted in casemates so that only the twin mount 10.5 cm anti-aircraft guns appear on deck. Everything above deck will have to be armored. The Führer does not consider it advisable to mix the 15 cm with the 10.5 cm guns. Protection of the ship's bottom is particularly urgent. The Führer mentions the gun loading gear aboard the CAVOUR which he considers more practical; he also speaks of the close proximity of the gun barrels in the turret, which makes the turret smaller.

VIII. Remarks of the Führer concerning control of planning in port cities by the Gauleiters.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, assumes that the Navy in Kiel was the cause of this directive. The Führer denies this and traces it back to the efforts of the Army and Luftwaffe to requisition large districts in cities without regard for over-all planning (e.g., without regard to railroads).

One person must decide these things, and that is the Gauleiter. In case of disagreement, the Führer will make the final decision. The Commander in Chief, Navy, stresses the need of considering the Navy's requirements before planning is undertaken in naval ports. Certain installations, such as docks, etc., can be placed only at certain points and an over-all plan must be guided by this fact. This must be agreed upon by the Gauleiter and the Navy before the final plans are completed. The Führer concedes this point. The commander in Chief, Navy, mentions the disagreement between the city of Kiel and the Navy over the Diedrichsen estate which has now been legally decided in favor of the Navy, as most of the heirs wished. The Navy needs these premises urgently for the 2nd Admiral of U-boats (2. A.d.U). It is situated on the harbor right outside Bellevue near the Wik. The city of Kiel wants it for an official guest house. The Führer will look into this question. It has evidently already been brought to his attention, although he does not admit it.

IX. The Commander in Chief, Navy, requests that the post of Chief of Staff to the Armed Forces Surgeon General be occupied in turn by the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. The determined factor here is not the number of personnel, bu the number of problems to be dealt with. The Führer agrees. The OKW will be informed of the matter.

Annex 1

I. The danger of air attacks on Brest compelled us to withdraw our ships from the coastal area of western France. Another reason for transferring our ships from the Atlantic was that on the basis of reports received, we had to consider the strong threat of an enemy landing in the Norwegian theater in the first part of the year. The Führer reacted with extensive instructions for strengthening our Norwegian defenses, which led to the removal of the main body of our fleet to Norway.

The invasion did not materialize. It is quite possible that the enemy deliberately planted the numerous reports about an impending invasion which came into our hands in order to make us commit our forces to Norway. It is also possible however that the English, on learning of our increased defense measures, dropped the idea of a landing in this area. At the present time, the threat to northern Norway is not considered acute, because our defenses are strong, and also because the enemy is impeded by a scarcity of ships.

Nevertheless, the area will continue to be a worthwhile objective for the enemy, especially since the nickel supply from Petsamo is indispensable to our war effort, and since the Barents Sea route to Russia will remain important to the Allies. The strength of our defenses will help determine whether the enemy will ever be in a position to attempt large-scale action in this area.

II. The presence of the main body of our fleet - formerly in French waters, new in the North - ties up a considerable part of the English fleet in its home waters. This is especially significant when one considers the increased losses which the combined enemy fleets have suffered this summer in all theaters of war. Under the circumstances it matters a great deal whether our forces lie in a strategic position ready for action, or whether they are kept in German harbors from which they must be moved before they can begin to function.

III. It does not seem necessary, considering the points made in paragraph I., to make a particularly strong concentration of German naval forces in northern Norway in the near future. But the object of holding English forces in home waters, explained in paragraph II, confirms the continued significance for the whole German-Italian-Japanese war effort of keeping the fleet in the Norwegian area. we should therefore strive as far as possible to continue holding naval forces there which will be ready for action during the coming months.

IV. Along with these considerations, it must be borne in mind that the Rybachi Peninsula still remains to be captured in Spring 1943. Although execution of the task has not yet been ordered, the Führer has instructed that preparations be started. Among these is the removal of the necessary naval forces to the zone of action. we could hardly conceal the landing craft which we would have to assemble, and the renewed transfer of the fleet to Norway would especially attract the enemy's attention. It would seem advantageous for this reason, too, that the enemy consider the presence of our ships in Norway a well-established fact.

V. The following ships will presumably be available for operation in winter 1942-1943:

A. Battleships: One battleship will be available at all times, the Tirpitz until the end of October 1942 and from October on the Scharnhorst.

B. Cruisers:

September - October 1942 . . . 1 heavy cruiser
November 42 - January 43 . . . 2 heavy cruisers
February 43 - April 43 . . . . . . 2 heavy cruisers

Hipper till the end of January 1943.
Prinz Eugen after 15 October 1942.
Lützow from November 1942 to April 1943.
Also the cruiser Köln until further orders.
Admiral Scheer has a special mission.

C. Destroyers: Available at all times an average of about 8 destroyers. Of 17 destroyers:

1. Two are assigned to the Warship Construction Testing Command (EKK).
   
2. About seven will be undergoing repair or engine overhaul at all times.

This leaves 8 destroyers. The number can be increased when the vessels under "1" are added.

D. Torpedo boats: Available at all times an average of about 7 boats. Of 27 torpedo boats:

1. Three are reserve boats in inactive status (T2, T3, T11).
   
2. Three are with the Warship Construction Testing Command (EKK).
   
3. Three are with the Torpedo School Flotilla (Greif, T1, T8).
   
4. Five in addition are assigned to the torpedo school.
   
5. About six will be under repair; having their engines overhauled.

This leaves 7 torpedo boats. The number can be increased when the vessels under "2." are added.

The above are the maximum figures. They do not include possible reductions caused by delays in shipyard schedules or by unforeseen occurances.

Annex 2

The continually growing threat of air raids and the damage already done to German shipyards in the North Sea and the western Baltic compel us to transfer our naval construction and repair installations farther to the East.

Our shipyard facilities are in any case too small. For these reasons it is necessary to utilize for naval warfare all shipyards which lie or will in the future lie within our sphere of power in the East.

The shipyards in Russian territory thus far captured (e.g., Libau, Riga, Tallinn) are unimportant because of their limited capacity. However, Leningrad possesses an especially highly developed shiphuilding industry. The handbook for Admiralty Staff officers "Soviet Russia", 3rd edition, 1939. contains detailed information of which we shall mention only the following:

The Zhdanov Shipyard (formerly the North Shipyard) and the adjoining Kirov Shipyards (formerly the Putilov Shipyards) with a personnel of 40,000 in three shifts.

The former Baltic Shipyard with a personnel of 29,000 in three shifts.

The former Petersburg State Shipyard with a personnel of 11,000 in three shifts.

Although we cannot expect that these establishments will fall into our hands undamaged in case Leningrad is taken, the Seekriegsleitung places such a high value on them that it requests the following:

A. Confirmation that the order OKW/WFST 449/p 10 Abt. L (Org II) Nr. 2656/41, Gkdos., dated 19 September 1941 is applicable also to Leningrad and Kronstadt.

B. Before the possible fall of Leningrad release of an order similar to that issued when Nikolayev fell (OKW/WFST 173/42 Gkdos. (Org 1), dated 9 February 1942).

C. After the fall of Leningrad, exemption of shipyards and similar plants from any intended reprisal measures.

Annex 3

1. Ju 88.

a. Long range reconnaissance plane:

· Maximum range: · Maximum range at   greatest fuel economy: · Bomb load (maximum): · Armament:

2,800 km at 370 km/h 3,400 km at 295 km/h 2,000 kg. 3 machine guns, model 81, single mount. 1 machine gun, model 81, twin mount.

b. Bomber:

· Maximum range: · Bomb load: · Armament:

2,100 km at 310 km/h 2,000 kg. 3 machine guns, model 81, single mount. 1 machine gun, model 81, twin mount.

c. Long range fighter:

· Maximum range: · Bomb load: · Armament:

2,800 km at 370 km/h Ten 50 kg bombs. 3 machine guns, model 17, fixed mount forward. 3 machine guns, model FF, fixed mount forward. 2 machine guns, model 81, single mount.

a. Long range reconnaissance plane:

· Maximum range: · Bomb load: · Armament:

3,800 km at 400 km/h 1,000 kg. 1 machine gun, model 81, single mount. 3 machine guns, model 131 single mount. 1 machine gun, model 151, tail mount.

b. Long range fighter:

· Maximum range: · Bomb load: · Armament:

3,740 km at about 390 km/h 1,000 kg possible. 1 machine gun, model 81, single mount. 2 forward mount moveable cannons, model 101 (30 mm)   or 2 model 151 machine guns. 3 machine guns, model 131, single mount. 1 machine gun, model 151, tail mount.

Annex 4

	Number of operational submarines in action each month	Number lost each month	Loss in percentage
1939 September October November December	40 40 40 40	2 5 1 1	5% 12.5% 2.5% 2.5%
1940 January February March April May June July August September October November December	33 45 44 46 32 29 27 27 26 27 22 23	1 4 3 4 2 1 1 3 1 - 3 -	3% 8% 7% 8% 6% 1% 1% 3% 1% - 3% -
1941 January February March April May June July August September October November December	21 22 30 32 36 60 64 75 75 81 86 90	- - 5 1 2 4 - 3 3 1 4 10	- - 17% 3% 5.5% 6.5% - 4% 4% 1% 5% 11%
1942 January February March April May June July August	101 111 122 124 128 141 153 168	5 2 5 4 3 2 9 10	5 1.8% 4.1% 3.3% 3.4% 1.4% 5.9% 6.0%

Losses in boats:

Total number of submarines in operation since beginning of war: Total number of submarines lost since beginning of war: Average monthly loss: Average monthly loss to the number in operation:

304 boats 105 boats 2.9 boats 4.9%

Losses in personnel:

	Officers	Senior non-commissioned officers (Portepee-Unteroffiziere)	Other Non-commissioned officers	Enlisted men	Total
Killed:	185	184	515	1,075	1,959
Captured:	112	113	323	600	1,148
Missing:	63	59	192	382	696
Total:	360	356	1,030	2,057	3,803

This means a 38% total loss of operating personnel each year.

Annex 5

I. The Walter firm in Kiel in co-operation with the High Command, Navy, has been experimenting on the Schlei River and in the Gulf of Danzig off Hela since early 1940 with a submarine which it calls model v80. The special characteristics of the submarine and the results obtained are as follows:

A. The size is approximately 80 tons.

B. It operates with a dual-purpose engine for surface and underwater travel with especially high underwater speed.

C. The hull is streamlined as far as possible.

D. Steering is by means of a control stick similar to that on aircraft.

E. Underwater and surface operation without complete weight adjustment is possible by making full use of the dynamic forces (except at slow speed).

F.	Underwater Performance:	to date:	desired:
	Estimated speed: Rpm of propeller: Horsepower:	23 knots (probably more) 885 1,500	28 knots 1,000 2,000

G. Seagoing Characteristics: The submarine rides the sea smoothly and does not pitch. It steers easily underwater and reacts very quickly.

A. It is essentially the same as present submarine except for a special drive for speed underwater.
1. This drive consists of two turbines with 4,000 h.p. without any bubble track.
2. In addition, it has a special drive with electric motors for low speeds underwater.
3. On the surface it is propelled by two Diesel engines with 600 h.p.

B. Has a control stick; fast surfacing and diving.

C. The Bridge is completely enclosed with plexiglas for optimum streamlining.

D. Calculated Performance:

1.	Underwater speed: Endurance at the top speed of Endurance at a cruising speed of	19 knots 19 knots: 10 knots:	205 nautical miles 450 nautical miles
2.	Endurance at a surface speed of	9.3 knots:	3,500 nautical miles

E. Its seagoing characteristics are like those of v80.

1.	a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.	Size: Over-all length: Beam: Draft: Diameter of pressure hull: Diving depth: Crew: Provisions and drinking water for:	220 cubic meters 35 meters 3.35 meters 4.1meters 3.3 meters 100 meters 12 men 14 days
2.	a.	Torpedo armament: 2 bow tubes for 5 meter torpedoes. 2 torpedoes in the tubes. 2 torpedoes in reserve.
	b.	No guns.
	c.	Communications equipment: 1 short-wave transmitter and receiver 1 direction finder 1 hydrophone (K.D.B. Anlage) 1 shallow sounder (Flachlot) 1 underwater telephonic apparatus (U.T. Anlage)
3.	a. b. c. d.	Open bridge for three men: no conning tower. Combined horizontal and vertical rudder control. Extensible attack periscope (up to 4 meters). Non-extensible sky search periscope (observation periscope)
4.	a.	Engine installations (single propeller) 2 turbines, 2,180 h.p. each. 1 Diesel engine, 210 h.p. 1 electric motor, 50 h.p.
	b.	Top Speed At depth of 12 meters: with 2 turbines 25.2 knots, with 1 turbine 18.7 knots On the Surface: with Diesel engine 9 knots, with electric motor 5 knots
	c.	Radius of action Submerged with 2 turbines (at maximum speed) 105 nautical miles Submerged with 1 turbine (at maximum speed) 160 nautical miles Diesel engine on surface 1,500 nautical miles

The Blohm and Voss boats are called Wa 201, and those of the Germania Shipyard are Wk 202.

The boats should be completed by fall 1943. Even if the tests on the new-type equipment prove satisfactory, we can scarcely count on these submarines before spring or summer 1944.

III. In order to produce a submarine for the Atlantic with high underwater speed we persisted at first in the construction of model v300. The contract was given to the Germania Shipyard in February 1942. The boat was intended as a school boat both for training crews and for testing the disposition and suitability of guns.

In 1942 we gained new knowledge in relation to building the small boats (wa 201) and to adapting their engines which brought the work on v300 to an end. In view of the new situation, v300 could no longer serve as a model for trans-Atlantic submarines.

Therefore we must begin anew the construction of an Atlantic boat. Plans to be drawn up by the Walter firm and later model construction at a shipyard (possibly Blohm and Voss and the Germania Shipyard again in competition) will require about six months. We can decide afterwards whether to build a boat of this kind or not. Certain difficulties are encountered at the Walter firm; they lack trained personnel. They asked that the Navy if possible release twenty engineers whom they have named. The request is under consideration.

The specifications for a submarine suitable for the Atlantic are as follows:

A. Size: B. Radius of action: C. Surface speed: D. Underwater speed: E. Torpedo armament:

800 tons 7,000-8,000 nautical miles 15 knots 26-27 knots 4 bow tubes, 16 torpedoes

The contract for building the training boat v300 at the Germania Shipyard was cancelled in the meantime.