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Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 1 March 1945, at 1630.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, was not present at the Führer conference on 28 February 1945.)
1. The Führer mentions again the transfer of the 1st Naval Division. He remarks that he thinks it would be well to transfer the 2nd Naval Division by battalions as they become ready for action to the area of Angermünde, in accordance with the suggestion of the Reichsführer SS. However he stresses emphatically that he insists on later committing the 2nd Naval Division in the Greifenhagen region, south of Stettin. The Commander in Chief, Navy, intends to wait for the report of the Admiral at Führer Headquarters, who was sent to the assembly area of the 2nd Naval Division, before he gives his opinion in this matter.
2. The Commander in Chief, Navy, declares that he cannot agree with a notation on the map of the Army General Staff concerning the situation at Army Group North, which states that ice conditions are impeding supply shipments across the Haff. He explains again that generally speaking the supplies for the 4th Army can be shipped across the Haff, although occasional interruptions must be anticipated because of ice conditions. The Führer adds that at the present stage of the war one must expect interference with all transportation; even transportation on land runs the constant risk of encountering damaged railway stations and tracks.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, makes the following statements, using a submarine chart which Kapitän zur See Assmann submits to the Führer: As such it is impractical to concentrate our submarines in the area of the British Isles, since this permits the enemy to concentrate his defensive weapons in a small area as well. Since, however, we cannot operate in other sea areas with the old Type VII C boats, because of their low submerged speed, we will be unable to extend the operational areas, thus possibly scattering enemy defenses, before the new vessels of Type XXI go into action. If we still had the Biscay coast we could use the old Type VII C vessels for more distant sea areas, for instance along the American coast. It seems that the enemy has not yet found any basically new means for locating and combatting submarines below the surface. In spite of that we must expect increased losses in the area around the British Isles. The enemy will do everything he possibly can to master the submarine danger in his home waters, and he will succeed more and more in doing so, considering the strength of his anti-submarine weapons. A particular difficulty for directing the submarines lies in the fact that the vessels can report their observations only on their return trip shortly before they enter port, or even not until afterwards. Thus the commanding officers cannot get an idea of the situation in the operational area and cannot draw the necessary conclusions for succeeding operations until very late.
4. In view of the expected arrival of the Commanding General of the Narvik Army Group, General [Ferdinand] Jodl, the Commander in Chief, Navy, informs the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, Generaloberst [Alfred] Jodl, that numerous measures of the Narvik Army Group are encroaching on naval authority over coastal defense by naval forces and coastal artillery, according to a report from the Naval Command, Norway. He asks the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, to inform his brother that the Commander in Chief, Navy, demands observance of the Führer's orders dealing with this point (Führer Directive No. 40 and supplements).
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, asks SS-Standartenführer Zander to inform Reichsleiter Bormann that he cannot approve Gauleiter Koch's measures with respect to the refugees in Königsberg and Pillau. If the Gauleiter fears a congestion with all the simultaneous disadvantages of food shortage, danger of epidemic and housing difficulties through the transfer of the refugees from Königsberg to Pillau, he should work in cooperation with the Navy to make the speed of evacuation from Königsberg correspond with the housing and transportation facilities beforehand, instead of presenting the Navy with accomplished facts and perhaps impossible tasks. SS-Standartenführer Zander confirms that Reichsleiter Bormann also does not agree with the measures of Gauleiter Koch, and he will do what is necessary.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 3 March 1945, at 1830.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 2 March 1945.)
1. During a report on the serious situation at Army Group Vistula southeast of Stettin, it is mentioned that the 1st Naval Division is being transferred from its old sector to the area east of Greifenhagen. One regiment departed the evening of 2 March, the second is to follow the evening of 3 March. The Führer regrets that in spite of repeated urging on his part, the transfer has been delayed by the Army Group so long. It now appears doubtful whether the division will still have time enough to get used to the new terrain and to intrench itself there. If possible the inexperienced division should not be thrown into offensive operations right away; in purely defensive action it will no doubt do its part well.
2. The Führer confirms his decision of 2 March, that the 2nd Naval Division should have priority and be equipped with arms at once; it is then to be assigned to the area south of Stettin in order to get further training behind the front on a battalion or regimental scale. The Commander in Chief, Navy, announces that the first units of the division can leave within ten days after receiving equipment. According to the report of the division commander, the division must be sent to a training area before entering combat, so that cooperation between infantry and Artillery which is still unfamiliar to the troops may be practiced. The Führer declares that there is no time for this, but that there is nothing to prevent them from carrying on this training in the area behind the front, without restriction as to the use of weapons.
3. The situation in the area Koeslin makes it necessary for the 2nd Army to be supplied by sea. The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out that in the main the supplies will have to be shipped to the ports of Gotenhafen and Danzig, since the small east Pomeranian ports can be entered only by smaller ships. Moreover, weather conditions at this time of year often make it altogether impossible to use them. The Führer in this connection stresses the necessity of holding the area of Danzig and Gotenhafen under all circumstances as a lifeline for the 2nd Army.
4. In the Holland area the 346th Division which was committed on the islands of the Meuse Delta and south of Rotterdam, is being withdrawn for duty elsewhere. It is to be replaced by naval and police units. The Commander in Chief, Navy, states once again that only the nucleus crews in the Holland area can be considered by the Navy for this task. Of these, four units of 4,000 men are already stationed at the Waal front and near Arnheim, while two more units of together also about 4,000 men are scattered in small units along the entire coast for defense purposes.
5. The situation in the area left of the Rhine causes the Commander in Chief, Navy, to call attention to the importance of the Dortmund-Ems Canal for the shipment of coal and other transportation tasks in the industrial area. (See Annex 1.) The Führer seizes this opportunity to stress the decisive importance of holding a wide bridgehead in the Duisburg area. In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the aid of a map showing the inland waterways, gives the Führer a summary of the Navy's plans with respect to the transportation of coal through the canal; he mentions the plan to circumvent the endangered spots along the canal with the help of field railways. He stresses the need of providing strong anti-aircraft protection for the endangered canal areas and the sixteen hitherto unprotected locks of the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The Führer recognizes this need. The Navy will send further details to the OKW, Air Operations Staff, immediately.
6. The problem of shipping supplies via the Frische Haff again is discussed. Up to now the Navy has succeeded in transporting all supplies available in Pillau to Rosenberg in spite of ice conditions.
7. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that he is worried about the mine situation in the Baltic. The enemy is making extensive use of minesweeping interference devices such as delay clocks and period-delay mechanisms, and has begun to use deep-note firing devices. However the Commander in Chief, Navy, hopes that we shall likewise master this type of firing device since the Mines Branch had the foresight to order mass production of anti-deep-tone mine devices (Mandolinengeräte) already a year ago, although it was in no way certain at that time that the enemy was going to use this type of firing device.
8. Concerning the announcement of submarine successes, the Commander in Chief, Navy, tells the Führer that it is best at present to release reports of submarine sinkings in small installments of about 50,000 tons and not to wait until larger figures accumulate. We should not arouse hopes prematurely that the new era in submarine warfare has begun, since we are still in a period of transition, and the new types of submarines will not become active to any extent before April. The Führer agrees with this opinion. The Commander in Chief, Navy, again points out that we must expect higher submarine losses in view of the concentration of enemy defense weapons in the area around the British Isles caused by the necessity to concentrate our submarines in that area. The day will come when it will no longer pay to concentrate our submarines in this fashion. We cannot expect any improvement of this situation until the new types of submarines go into action.
9. The Commander in Chief, Navy, hands the Führer a report of the Fortification Commander, La Rochelle, Vizeadmiral Schirlitz, concerning the recent sortie and the nature of the information received from the prisoners taken; general dissatisfaction with the de Gaulle government is indicated.
10. The Commander in Chief, Navy, is considering reinforcing the 1st Naval Division in its new position by alarm units from the fortification Swinemünde. He will discuss the necessary measures with the Reichsführer SS (Commanding General, Army Group Vistula) personally after he receives a report of this matter from the Admiral, Baltic.
11. In view of the difficult ammunition situation of the Army, the Commander in Chief, Navy, orders an investigation to determine whether the Navy can spare artillery ammunition for the Army. This action is taken on the basis of a favorable report on naval ammunition supplies.
Annex 1
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Report by the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports for the Wehrmacht, Konteradmiral Engelhardt, to the Commander in Chief, Navy, on 1 March 1945 at 2130.
1. Konteradmiral Engelhardt reports on the outcome of a conference on 1 March 1945 about the coal supply of the Navy and the utilization of the inland waterways. At that time he conferred with Ministerialdirektor Kehrl and Ministerialdirektor Dorsch of the Speer Ministry, Ministerialdirektor Hasenpflug and Ministerialdirektor Bauer from the Ministry of Transportation, and representatives of the Reich Commissioner for Coal. After explaining the coal situation of the Navy and of maritime shipping, Konteradmiral Engelhardt points to the necessity of using the canal from the Rhine to the Ems for moving coal for the Navy, since shipments on the Rhine itself, which had already gotten underway, had to be discontinued because of enemy advances in the Cleves sector. The following decisions were made:
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a. The Ruhr transport flotilla of the Navy will be authorized to travel on the canals under discussion.
b. Korvettenkapitän Rössing will be appointed as representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy, and of Minister Speer to direct and accelerate traffic on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. His main task will be to solve the problem of the endangered sections of the canal near Ladbergen.
c. To by-pass this endangered section of the canal, the Todt Organization, under the direction of Ministerialdirektor Dorsch, will quickly lay field railways with numerous side tracks for reloading. At present the entire Dortmund-Ems Canal is navigable. However, the endangered stretch is generally dry, and is filled only once every ten days to let the accumulated vessels through. This takes about twelve hours every time and moves about 50,000 tons. The narrow-gauge railroad is to take care of an additional 2,000 tons a day in the future. It should be examined whether the dry section of the canal could be filled more often than three times a month. The coal shipped on naval vessels is to be for the exclusive use of the Navy.
3. Konteradmiral Engelhardt considers it necessary to assign a signal company to the Dortmund-Ems Canal in order to safeguard radio and telephone connections between the various operational sectors. The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees; the details are to be discussed directly between the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch and the Naval Communications Division.
4. Konteradmiral Engelhardt considers it necessary to install anti-aircraft guns along the vulnerable section of the canal, at the sixteen locks of the Dortmund-Ems Canal which have been unprotected up to now, as well as near Gravenhorst on the Mittelland Canal. Repair of the damage at the latter place will be finished about April by the Todt Organization. The Commander in Chief, Navy, decides to make the necessary requests.
5. In order to return inactive tugboats to service, the Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch has provided for thirty crews. To be prepared against shipping accidents, Konteradmiral Engelhardt is planning to transfer salvage equipment from Holland to the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Konteradmiral Engelhardt requests the speedy transfer of the 800 men who are intended for the Rhine flotilla and who are to be withdrawn from the Swinemünde sector, as these men are absolutely essential for maintaining the coal transports.
6. Upon inquiry by the Commander in Chief, Navy, Konterdmiral Engelhardt reports that when all these measures become effective it will probably be possible to ship about 100,000 to 140,000 tons of coal for the Navy via this route.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 4 March 1945, at 1600.
1. Due to further advances in the area of Army Group Bruno, the enemy is threatening the Duisburg harbor. The Commander in Chief, Navy, again points out the importance of this harbor as a port of transshipment for inland water navigation. Only part of the coal to be shipped is handled in Duisburg, however; most of it is transferred in the Herne and Dortmund area. Coal shipments by the Navy on the Dortmund-Ems Canal have gotten under way. The first two barges with 500 tons of coal have arrived in Emden, while ten more barges are on the way north after having passed the section of the canal endangered by the enemy. The Chief, Luftwaffe Operations Staff, reports that an enemy air attack caused new damage to the Dortmund-Ems Canal at Ladbergen. The extent of damages is not yet known. The construction of narrow-gauge field railways becomes even more important under the circumstances in order to make it possible to by-pass these damaged points.
2. The Führer fears that enemy landings aimed at outflanking us may occur on the Italian Adriatic coast. There are no definite signs as yet substantiating such fears; nevertheless the situation demands careful watching.
3. The question is raised that it is wrong to have older men operate the modern and very effective 8 cm. anti-tank guns, as is being done in many instances. The Führer inquires whether the Navy could make available enough young personnel to man 200 anti-tank guns (one noncommissioned officer and seven men for each anti-tank gun). The Commander in Chief, Navy, is of the opionion that it might be well to take these men from the emergency units stationed in Swinemünde, because they have many specialists in their ranks. A decision is reached first of all to send a large number of anti-tank guns to the Dievenow front where these units have been put into action.
4. The Führer criticizes the inadequate amount of ammunition available for the 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns of the Luftwaffe at the Oder front. The Luftwaffe inquires whether the Navy can provide ammunition for 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns, Model 56. This is to be investigated.
5. The Chief of the Army General Staff [Generaloberst Guderian] again raises the question of the order in which various divisions - at present either being organized or being brought up to full strength, among them the 2nd Naval Division - are to be equipped with arms. The Commander in Chief, Navy, emphasizes again that it is important to furnish the 2nd Naval Division with weapons as soon as possible. This division is composed of very good men, most of them experienced and seasoned. The Führer decides that the 2nd Naval Division and the parachute troops be given priority in allocation of equipment.
6. During the discussion of the situation of the Northern Army Group, the Commander in Chief, Navy, stresses the fact that it is vital to hold the area south of the Königsberg Sea Canal. Loss of that area could cause considerable interference with the sea traffic using the canal. Pillau could be subjected to direct fire from the Balga Peninsula.
7. The Chief of the Army General Staff requests that the Commander in Chief, Navy, make available naval emergency units stationed in Swinemünde for transfer to the Dievenow front. The Commander in Chief, Navy, informs him that two of the four emergency units are already in action at the Dievenow front. The two remaining emergency units at present at the western front of the defense sector Swinemünde are under orders to move east.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 6 March 1945, at 1600.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 5 March 1945.)
1. In the afternoon of 5 March, the Admiral at Führer Headquarters transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Navy, the order of the Führer to examine the availability of further naval emergency units for the Stettin area. The Commander in Chief, Navy, decided to assign for this purpose the 1st Naval Engineering Training Unit which consists of 750 men. He reports this fact to the Führer with the remark that this unit is predominantly equipped with Dutch rifles, very little ammunition, and hardly any machine guns. The Führer orders that German rifles be issued immediately to this group, and gives the Chief of the General Army Office, General Buhle, instructions to that effect.
2. The Führer confirms his views expressed already on several occasions concerning the assignment of the 2nd Naval Division. He states that after being properly equipped, the division should be transferred to the Stettin area; its exact operational area will be determined later depending on the prevailing situation.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 8 March 1945, at 1600.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 7 March 1945.)
1. During the discussion of the situation on the Western Front, the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff [Generaloberst Jodl], mentions that two Navy demolition teams were assigned to destroy the Rhine bridge at Remagen, which fell into enemy hands intact. An inquiry with the Commanding Admiral, Small Battle Units [Kleinkampfverbände], showed that nothing was known there of such an assignment. An investigation has been ordered.
2. The Chief of the Army General Staff [Generaloberst Guderian], reports on the artillery equipment on the Dievenow front. The Führer expresses the opinion that the artillery allotted to this sector should be sufficient, especially since support can be given to the land operations by the ship artillery of the naval forces.
3. Referring to the situation on the lower Oder, the Commander in Chief, Navy, explains to the Führer that the navigational channel passes about 4 kilometers from Stepenitz and about 2 kilometers from the westernmost point of the coastal sector occupied by the Russians. This makes it impossible to pass through the channel during the day, but it was possible to use the channel during the night so far without enemy interference.
4. In reference to the loss of the passenger ship HAMBURG anchored at Sassnitz the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that the cause of the sinking will be investigated, and if necessary severe measures will be taken. The precarious mine situation off Sassnitz is indicative of the mine danger to which the western Baltic Sea is exposed. An intensification of enemy activity in this area would be most undesirable. This fact once more emphasizes the need for holding Stettin and Swinemünde. At the same time this situation proves conclusively that shipping lanes must be closed, as was done in the past, when mines are suspected.
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that Gauleiter Schwede-Koburg, in cooperation with the Navy, has taken all measures to render the harbor and the railroad facilities of Sassnitz serviceable again as soon as possible.
6. In connection with the attack on the landing barge convoy in the Skagerrak on 7 March the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that the British Admiralty is supposed to have expressed its intention from now on to press the attacks on convoys in the Skagerrak from the air. For this reason the Commander in Chief, Navy, has ordered that the most endangered stretches will in the future be traveled only at night.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 9 March 1945, at 1700.
1. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that two detachments have been chosen for blowing up the Rhine bridge at Remagen, and that they are being sent there as fast as possible. They are to attempt to blow up each of the piers with two torpedo mines (TMC) attached to one another. It is not possible at this time to predict when the preparations will be completed; everything is being done to speed them up.
2. Regarding the submarine situation, the Commander in Chief reports that two submarines are overdue. Since all of the submarines which have returned have reported successes, it can be assumed that the missing submarines were successful, too, although we cannot find out what they accomplished. Thus we must count on the probability that the figures which we publish are really less than the actual sinkings. This has the disadvantage that the enemy might be able to draw his conclusions as to our submarine losses. Regardless of this fact the Commander in Chief, Navy, thinks that we should continue the policy of publishing the exact figures of the results actually known.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, the Reichsmarschall, and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff discuss the question of utilizing the aircraft tenders of the Luftwaffe which have been put at the disposal of Gauleiter Forster. The Commander in Chief, Navy, requests that all vessels used for evacuating refugees, in cluding those belonging to the Luftwaffe, be operated by the Navy alone. The Reichsmarschall will comply by putting all vessels belonging to the Luftwaffe under the command of the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transport, for operational assignment.
4. In a conversation with the Commander in Chief, Navy, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring declared that although the naval harbor Pola has been declared a fortress, he is unable to spare enough forces to hold Pola against an enemy attack for any length of time. Since it is planned to have the main battle line at the base of the Istrian Peninsula, the Field Marshal cannot send additional troops to Pola. The fortress commander of Pola, Captain Waue, who makes an excellent impression, thus faces an insolvable task. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring agrees that Pola must remain in our hands as long as possible, in order to keep the enemy from using its harbor; still he is of the opinion that he, as Commanding General, Southwest, should make the decision regarding the evacuation of Pola. He is therefore going to request that the order making Pola a defense area be cancelled. The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees with this point of view; his only concern is that we hold Pola as long as possible, in order to prevent the enemy from making landing preparations in a harbor close to the front. As far as our own fighting forces are concerned, Pola has no decisive importance as a point of departure.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 10 March 1945, at 1600.
1. The possibility of a British landing in the northern Adriatic is again discussed. The Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that the British seem to be trying to spare their strength in view of the overall political situation. For this reason, large, independent British landing operations are not likely to be undertaken either in the Adriatic or in the German Bight. Holland is a different matter; the British must have great interest in occupying it because of the danger to the Channel traffic. The Führer agrees with the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Navy. He thinks, too, that the British inaction in Yugoslavia, where even a few troops could have caused us great difficulties, can be explained only by the fact that the British are intentionally trying to save their forces.
2. General Jodl reports to the Führer a request from the Commanding General, Norway, asking for permission to withdraw from the northern Norwegian area to the region south of Narvik because of lack of supplies, especially of coal and fuel. The Führer believes that if we vacated Narvik we might be providing Sweden with an opportunity to enter the war against us, since she would then have excellent connections with the Anglo-Americans. Aside from that, the Lofotens are one of the most valuable Norwegian fishing areas and they are important for our food supply. The Führer therefore does not permit an evacuation of this area. However he asks for suggestions how more troops might be withdrawn from there so as to release troops for the home theater of war. The supply difficulties, especially in regard to coal, caused by the many troop transports in particular, must be overcome. Of prime consideration in the Führer's decision is the fact that if northern Norway were occupied by the enemy, southern Norway, which is an indispensable submarine base, would also be endangered. As to the coal situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy, states that it is entirely a matter of inadequate transportation within Germany. If sufficient quantities of coal are brought to the German ports, he can assure their transportation by sea. According to the reports so far, 28,000 tons of coal are still to be shipped to Norway in March. The efforts of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to get additional quantities of coal to the coast via canals, by-passing the dangerous stretch near Ladbergen by means of narrow-gauge field railways, promise to be successful, and they are being continued energetically.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that he has ordered twelve 7.5 anti-tank guns to be taken from Denmark to reinforce the Dievenow position.
4. Concerning the transportation of refugees, the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that he has requested the Führer to give orders that the refugees be disembarked in Copenhagen, so that their evacuation will not be interrupted in spite of the loss of Sassnitz and in spite of the mine fields in the western Baltic Sea. Aside from the immediate evacuation of about 50,000 refugees from Kolberg, the area Danzig-Gotenhafen remains the main point of refugee evacuation.
5. During the report on the successful raid on the port of Granville by the forces stationed on the Channel Islands, the Commander in Chief, Navy, states that the newly assigned commander of the Channel Islands, Vizeadmiral Hüffmeier, is the heart and soul of this vigorous action.
6. The representative of the Luftwaffe, Major Büchs, reports that a gap 80 meters long was torn in the Lippe Canal near the place where it crosses the Dortmund-Ems Canal near Datteln, and the water has run out at that place. Concerning the repair of such damage in transportation facilities, the Commander in Chief, Navy, says that the population must be called on to do this work just as it has been the custom for centuries, even in peace time, whenever there was a break in a dike on the coast. The Führer agrees absolutely with this and he states that he has already ordered similar measures for damages along the railroad lines. (About 800,000 workers are in readiness.)
7. The 2nd Army in West Prussia reports shortage of ammunition. The Commander in Chief, Navy, states that in such situations, if necessary, even steamers already at sea and carrying ammunition must be diverted and sent to the places where the need is greatest. (In a discussion after the conference between the Commander in Chief, Navy, the Chief of the OKW, the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, it is decided that such diversions may only be ordered by the authorized offices of the OKW and the Army, and that therefore close cooperation between the General Headquarters, Army and the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Scandinavia, is required. This is to be secured in the future.) In addition, the Commander in Chief, Navy, points out to the Chief of the Army General Staff, that only one of the four ammunition steamers being loaded in Swinemünde at the moment is intended for the 2nd Army, and he suggests an investigation to determine whether it would not be necessary to change these plans in favor of the 2nd Army.
8. The Chief of the Army General Staff reports that the Norwegian tanker GERDMOR which was intended for the eastern area has been lying in Swinemünde for several days because of sabotage by the Norwegian crew, and it still has not left port. (it was discovered later that it was not a case of sabotage, but that the tanker was rammed twice and that in addition the Norwegian captain had to be replaced because of drunkenness.)
9. The Führer decides that the Naval Divisions will henceforth be known as Naval Infantry Divisions.
10. In connection with the conversation on 9 March with Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring concerning Pola, the Commander in Chief, Navy, asks the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, to include him when making any possible new decisions regarding the defense of Pola.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 12 March 1945, at 1600.
(Note: On 11 March 1945 the Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference.)
1. In discussing the future operational policy of Army Group, Vistula, the Commander in Chief, Navy, again calls attention to the fact that the loss of Stettin will result in serious consequences for our strategy. Swinemünde cannot take over the traffic from Stettin, especially since the harbor of Swinemünde, with its limited facilities makes it impossible to disperse the ships, in contrast to Stettin. (The Commander in Chief, Navy, presents a plan of Swinemünde harbor as it was in the middle of February, which shows the situation clearly, although in the meantime conditions have grown considerably worse due to the fact that Stettin cannot be used.) The air attack with at least 400 planes against Swinemünde on 12 March proves that the enemy realizes the situation and plans to take advantage of it. Prior to the attack eleven transport ships, not to speak of other vessels, had arrived in Swinemünde for unloading. The Commander in Chief, Navy, therefore regards it essential to free the lower Oder River and the eastern side of the Haff at least to the extent that traffic can get through to Stettin. The Führer orders the Chief of the Army General Staff, Operations Division, General Krebs, to make the necessary calculations for this and other operations, to be used by the Führer in making future decisions. He is of the opinion, however, that judging from the information at hand a larger operation such as the Commander in Chief, Navy, suggests would hardly be possible.
2. The development of the situation in the 2nd Army sector in West Prussia causes the Commander in Chief, Navy, to point out that it is imperative to control the Hel Peninsula and the coastal area between Hel and the naval bases Gotenhafen and Danzig if these harbors are to be utilized. When General Saucken reports to the Führer after the conference on the situation, this matter will again be discussed in detail.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, calls the Führer's attention to the fact that the 3rd Naval Infantry Regiment with a combat strength of 800 men is distributed along a front 46 kilometers long on the west side of the Frische Haff. General Krebs reports that reinforcements are on their way to this sector.
4. The Commander in Chief, Navy, submits to the Führer the answer of the commander of the Channel Islands, Vizeadmiral Hüffmeier, to the telegram of the Commander in Chief, Navy, congratulating him on the Granville sortie. Vizaadmiral Hüffmeier expresses the hope that he will be able to hold the Channel Islands for another year.
5. On the basis of the final report about the operations of the first two submarines of Type XXIII to go into active service, the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that these vessels stood the test well. This is all the more gratifying because at the time the new submarines were put into mass production, this was done without previous trials.
6. The British "Atlantik-Sender" has announced that Germany plans to use amphibious commandoes from the Navy to blow up the Rhine bridge at Remagen. The Commander in Chief, Navy, informs the Führer that he intends to carry out this plan regardless, because there is a possibility that the British made the announcement in order to mislead us.
7. After the conference on the situation the Commander in Chief, Navy, discusses with the Chief of the Army General Staff, Operations Division, General Krebs, the necessity of sending sufficient ammunition at once to the 2nd Army, in view of the developments in West Prussia. He expresses his worry about the fact that the Chief Supply and Administration Officer of the Army does not make adjustments quickly enough when the situation changes. The Commander in Chief, Navy, does not think that it would be practical to reorganize the supply system; he believes, however, that many difficulties could be eliminated if the authorities concerned would work in closer cooperation and if the Chief Supply and Administration Officer, Army, would show more understanding for conditions governing sea-borne supplies. He suggests therefore that the Chief Supply and Administration Officer, Army, arrange for a liaison office between his own organization and that of the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, Navy.
8. The Chief of the OKW informs the Commander in Chief, Navy, that he has issued the March allotments of anti-aircraft weapons, and he asks the Commander in Chief, Navy, to investigate whether the amount allotted to the Navy is large enough to take care of the needs of sea transportation, too. If not, he is considering special action in order to make available an adequate quantity of anti-aircraft weapons for transport and merchant ships.
9. In connection with a request by the 1st Naval Infantry Division for more ammunition and arms, General Buhle reports to the Commander in Chief, Navy, that requests for current ammunition requirements must be directed to the proper army; he will investigate the possibility of getting the desired arms (100 light machine guns, 50 heavy machine guns, 20 medium trench mortars).
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 13 March 1945, at 1600.
1. Future operational possibilities of Army Group, Vistula, are again discussed, although estimates and suggestions of the Army General Staff have not yet been received. In reply to a comment made by the Commander in Chief, Navy, that it is essential to open the Oder passage to Stettin, and that Swinemünde is inadequate as the only port in the central Baltic Sea, the Führer states chat he fully recognizes these facts, but that for reasons of land warfare these operations will have to be postponed.
2. The Führer mentions that he has given orders to renew the manufacture of ammunition for heavy naval artillery. He is of the opinion that this would affect the armament industry only very little as far as material and labor are concerned. The Chief of the Army Organization Division in the OKW, General Buhle, (Artillery) will receive instructions to inform Speer accordingly. The Navy is to make specific demands.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, announces that three additional steamers of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping will be used for the evacuation of refugees, and that it is necessary to continue to bring refugees in large numbers to Copenhagen. The Führer agrees.
4. The Chief of the Luftwaffe, Operations Staff, reports to the Führer about the anti-aircraft defenses of the Dortmund-Ems Canal. More light anti-aircraft guns have already been provided than were requested by the Navy. The heavy anti-aircraft batteries along the endangered canal sections will be reinforced. It is planned to use smoke screens to protect these stretches.
5. During a discussion of the small number of planes ready for action and the low effectiveness of the new plane types, the Commander in Chief, Navy, seizes the opportunity to raise this subject in regard to submarines. Of the 130 operational submarines available in February 1945 for service in the Atlantic, on an average 64 were at sea; out of this number only about 17 were in the operational zones due to the disproportion existing between time needed to reach the operational zone and time actually spent in operation. The trip from German ports to the operational areas in the Channel and the Irish Sea takes an average of 24 days, while the trip from ports in the bay of Biscay to the same areas required only about 4 days. It therefore becomes evident that the loss of the Bay of Biscay has grave consequences for the renewal of submarine warfare.
6. After another talk with the Chief of the Army General Staff about the organization of supply shipments to cut-off Army groups, and on the basis of his renewed request concerning the position of the Supply and Transportation Office, Scandinavia, the Commander in Chief, Navy, decides to invite all parties concerned, i.e. the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports; the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping; the Supply and Transportation Office, Scandinavia; and the Army Quartermaster General for a discussion in order to get a clear picture of all factors involved, in order to organize matters in the most efficient manner.
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